THE SOLACE OF EXTREMISM: AN EXAMINATION OF EXISTENTIAL MOTIVATION AND THE PERSUASIVENESS OF EXTREME GROUPS by Massey, Zachary
UNIVERSITY OF OKLAHOMA 
GRADUATE COLLEGE 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
THE SOLACE OF EXTREMISM: AN EXAMINATION OF EXISTENTIAL MOTIVATION 
AND THE PERSUASIVENESS OF EXTREME GROUPS 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A DISSERTATION 
SUBMITTED TO THE GRADUATE FACULTY 
in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the  
Degree of 
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
By 
ZACHARY BROCK MASSEY 
Norman, Oklahoma 
2019 
 THE SOLACE OF EXTREMISM: AN EXAMINATION OF EXISTENTIAL MOTIVATION 
AND THE PERSUASIVENESS OF EXTREME GROUPS 
 
A DISSERTATION APPROVED FOR  
THE DEPARTMENT OF COMMUNICATION 
 
 
 
 
 
BY 
 
Dr. Claude Miller 
 
Dr. Elena Bessarabova 
 
Dr. Young Kim 
 
Dr. Ioana Cionea 
 
Dr. Shane Connelly 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
© Copyright by ZACHARY B. MASSEY 2019 
All Rights Reserved. 
  iv 
Dedication 
 I dedicate this work to my mother, Shannon Kathleen Emmons, who passed away 
unexpectedly on June 7th, 2018. While I am happy to finish this dissertation, I do so with a heavy 
heart. I have lost my greatest teacher. My mother taught me kindness is a wonderful gift, and 
easy to give. And importantly, that it does not matter if you fall down, only that you get up. As 
this dissertation is public record, I hope some part of her will live on through my remembrance. 
She was a farm girl and a lawyer—one part grit, one part glamour. She loved dogs, expensive 
diners, and above all, spending time with family. She was a wonderful mother and an even better 
human being. She shined. I dedicate this work to her.  
  
 
 
  v 
Acknowledgments 
I owe tremendous thanks to my wife, Cali. She supported me as an undergraduate. 
Encouraged me as a Master’s. Heartened me through the Ph.D. She has sustained our little 
family for over 10 years. Every lecture, presentation, or paper, I could not have done without her. 
Any certification or award, I owe to her. I do not have words to express my gratitude. In Anna 
Karenina, Tolstoy described the character Levin seeing his love Kitty. Tolstoy wrote: “He 
stepped down, trying not to look long at her, as if she were the sun, yet he saw her, like the sun, 
even without looking.” I feel this same awe everyday and I am grateful for that. Thank you Cali. 
We did it, kiddo.  
I have two co-advisors, both of whom I owe thanks. I first became acquainted with Dr. 
Claude Miller in his Social Influence Seminar, in fall 2014. I was moved by the passion Dr. 
Miller showed for research, and not just findings, but the process of contemplating, planning, 
designing, and executing interesting and meaningful inquiry. There was an infectious passion in 
the way Claude taught and encouraged us to grow as scholars. Outside the classroom, and over 
the years, Dr. Miller has been especially generous with his time, whether working on study ideas, 
drafting papers, or writing letters on my behalf, he has always dedicated his resources towards 
helping me succeed, and for that I am grateful. Thank you, Claude. I appreciate your help.  
Dr. Elena Bessarabova has been a wonderful mentor and advisor. I am grateful for her 
guidance. Dr. Bessarabova shows concern for her student’s well being, while at the same time, 
holding rigorous standards for their scholarship and conduct. I admire this combination of 
thoughtfulness and meticulousness, and it informs the type of professor I hope to be one day. 
Elena is generous with her time, always willing to meet, and talk, or strategize a way through 
grad school. I will miss not being able to stop by her office for advice, a friendly chat, or 
  vi 
impromptu caffeine run. Elena always takes care of her tribe, and luckily, I count myself among 
them. I am honored to have been her first advisee. Thank you, Elena.  
 I met Dr. Kim when I took her Interethnic Communication class as an undergraduate. Dr. 
Kim’s unique teaching style was striking. She assigned readings and presentations, which 
allowed us to discuss controversial issues surrounding ethnicity in a collegial manner. As a 
facilitator, Dr. Kim blended cutting-edge research on ethnicity with open discussion. It was 
refreshing and invigorating—a total departure from any class I had taken. Dr. Kim graciously 
served as my Master’s advisor, and always pushed me to be a better student, scholar, and person. 
I have great respect for Dr. Kim’s work, but also, her belief in the dignity of humankind, and the 
moral imperative for scholarship to enlighten and inform that condition.       
 My first graduate course was with Dr. Ioana Cionea, who endured my clumsy attempts at 
intellectualism. Over the years, I have had the opportunity to work with Dr. Cionea on multiple 
projects, and I can say she is always positive, encouraging, understanding, and also, willing to 
meet and discuss any issue, any time, related to her class or not. In fact, she is so accommodating 
in helping students; it is difficult to get into her office. Dr. Cionea has always been professional 
and organized in her conduct, and I admire her commitment to teaching, and research. I hope one 
day I can be as diligent, understanding, and student-centered, as Dr. Cionea.  
 Dr. Shane Connelly agreed to do a Directed Reading with me, even though we had never 
met. Dr. Connelly courteously worked with me over summer break to better understand the 
psychological literature on ideological groups. These readings would serve as the foundation for 
my dissertation, and so I owe Dr. Connelly huge thanks. I have appreciated her openness, 
friendliness, and positivity. Thank you Dr. Connelly your time and consideration in developing 
this project over the years, and also, your willingness to serve on this committee. 
  vii 
Table of Contents 
Acknowledgments........................................................................................................................... v 
List of Tables .................................................................................................................................. x 
List of Figures ................................................................................................................................ xi 
Abstract ......................................................................................................................................... xii 
Chapter 1: Introduction ................................................................................................................... 1 
Existential Motivation and Persuasive Communication ............................................................. 5 
Benefits of Social Group Membership ....................................................................................... 6 
Physical Advantages ............................................................................................................... 7 
Psychological Advantages ...................................................................................................... 8 
Cultural Advantages................................................................................................................ 8 
Thesis .................................................................................................................................... 10 
Chapter 2: Literature Review ........................................................................................................ 12 
Uncertainty Identity Theory ...................................................................................................... 13 
Self-Uncertainty: Support for Extreme Groups and Radical Behavior ................................ 16 
The Uncertainty-Threat Model of Political Extremism ............................................................ 17 
Ideological Conservatism as Motivated Social Cognition .................................................... 18 
Threat and Uncertainty: Conservatism, Not Extremism ....................................................... 20 
Challenges to the UTM ......................................................................................................... 22 
Chapter 3: Present Research ......................................................................................................... 25 
Hypotheses and Research Questions ........................................................................................ 27 
Chapter 4: Method ........................................................................................................................ 35 
Participants ............................................................................................................................ 35 
  viii 
Design ................................................................................................................................... 35 
Procedure and Materials ....................................................................................................... 36 
Instrumentation ..................................................................................................................... 42 
Pretest Measures ................................................................................................................... 44 
In-lab Measures ..................................................................................................................... 45 
Qualitative Counterargument Data ....................................................................................... 47 
Chapter 5: Results ......................................................................................................................... 49 
Multivariate Results .............................................................................................................. 49 
Hypotheses Tests: H1 through H3 ........................................................................................ 50 
Hypothesis Test: H4 .............................................................................................................. 54 
Research Question 1 ............................................................................................................. 55 
Hypotheses Tests: H5 through H7 ........................................................................................ 57 
Chapter 6: Discussion ................................................................................................................... 59 
Support for UIT: Theoretical and Social Implications  ........................................................ 60 
Self-uncertainty, Group Extremism, and Group Ideology .................................................... 64 
Ideological Congruence and Support for an Extreme Group................................................ 66 
Counterargumentation and Persuasion ................................................................................. 68 
Source Credibility and the Appeal of Extreme Groups ........................................................ 70 
Limitations and Future Directions ........................................................................................ 72 
Conclusion ................................................................................................................................ 74 
References ..................................................................................................................................... 77 
APPENDIX A: MAGNITUDE INSTRUCTIONS ..................................................................... 110 
APPENDIX B: MEASURES ...................................................................................................... 111 
  ix 
APPENDIX C: CODING INSTRUCTIONS ............................................................................. 116 
APPENDIX D: OP-EDS ............................................................................................................. 117 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
  x 
List of Tables 
Table 1.  Entitativity Indicators Deviating from Normality 
Assumptions..............................................................................................96 
 
Table 2. Identification Indicators Deviating from Normality 
Assumptions……………………………………………………………..97 
 
Table 3. Behavioral Intentions Indicators Deviating from Normality 
Assumptions……………………………………………………………..98 
 
Table 4. Source Credibility Indicators Deviating from Normality 
Assumptions……………………………………………………………..99 
 
Table 5. Attitude Indicators Deviating from Normality Assumptions…………..100 
 
Table 6. Message Quality Indicators Deviating from Normality 
Assumptions……………………………………………………………101 
 
Table 7. Self-uncertainty Indicators Deviating from Normality 
Assumptions……………………………………………………………102 
 
Table 8. Eigenvalues for Principle Components Variables……………….........103 
 
Table 9. Reliabilities and Bivariate Correlations Between Variables…………...104 
 
Table 10. Simple Effect for Congruent Ideology × Group Extremism Two-way 
Interaction………………………………………………………………105 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
  xi 
List of Figures 
Figure 1.  Simple effect of Self-uncertainty on Goodwill within the Extreme 
Condition.................................................................................................106 
 
Figure 2. Simple effect of Self-uncertainty on Attitudes within the Extreme 
Condition……………………………………………………………….107 
 
Figure 3. Self-uncertainty × Group Extremism × Group Ideology Interaction on 
Goodwill……………………………………………………………..…108 
 
Figure 4. Self-uncertainty × Group Extremism × Group Ideology Interaction on 
Attitudes……………………………………………………………..…109 
 
 
  
  xii 
Abstract 
This dissertation examines the persuasive appeal of extreme groups under conditions of 
self-uncertainty. The guiding theoretical framework, uncertainty-identity theory (UIT; Hogg, 
2007) argues self-uncertainty motivates people to identify with social groups. In this regard, UIT 
also considers properties of groups, arguing those high in entitativity (i.e., who tend to be rigid 
and uncompromising) are extreme in nature, and also more attractive to self-uncertain 
individuals. Given debate within the literature as to whether liberals or conservatives are more 
prone to identify with extreme groups (Jost & Napier, 2012), ideological congruence between 
group (sender) and participant (receiver) is also a factor in this research. The experimental study 
presented here (N = 423) applies a 2 (group extremism: moderate vs. extreme) × 2 (self-
uncertainty: certain vs. uncertain) × 2 (ideological congruence: congruent vs. non-congruent) 
independent groups design.  
Altogether, results point to three general conclusions. First, UIT was supported, with self-
uncertainty showing a main effect across all outcome variables. Second, self-uncertainty 
interacted with group extremism, resulting in more favorable attitudes toward positions 
advocated by an extreme group, as well as more perceived goodwill from the extreme group 
leaders. Third, ideological congruence between sender and receiver only affected behavioral 
intentions for liberals and not conservatives. Additionally, the two-way interaction between 
ideological congruence and group extremism showed greater preference for a moderate 
congruent group and not an extreme one. Finally, an unexpected main effect for group extremism 
points to the need for greater scrutiny of source credibility outcomes in future research.  
Keywords. Uncertainty-identity theory, extreme groups, persuasion, source credibility, 
ideology, ideological congruence  
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
The influence of extreme groups poses a pressing challenge for democratic societies 
(Cordesman, 2017; Poushter, 2017). According to European law enforcement agencies, jihadi 
extremism is contributing to the recent increase in terrorist attacks across the European continent 
(Europol, 2017). Ethnically motivated hate crimes are also on the rise, as is right-wing 
extremism, both of which have been linked to assaults on religious and government leaders in 
Europe. Along similar lines, left-wing groups have used public demonstrations to destroy 
property, assault police officers, and foment unrest (Europol, 2017); all the while, authoritarian 
populism is gaining momentum in several European countries, as evidenced by the success of 
nationalist, anti-immigrant political groups in Austria, Germany, and France (YouGov, 2016).   
Similar conditions can be found in the United States, as the number of hate crimes 
targeting individuals based on ethnicity, religion, and gender has risen over the past several years 
(Federal Bureau of Investigation, 2016), especially in major US cities (Center for the Study of 
Hate and Extremism, 2017). Such discord mirrors broader trends, as Americans exhibit historic 
levels of political polarization, with citizens describing those who do not share their views in 
extremely negative terms (Doherty, 2014). Distrust reflects wavering institutional support, as 
faith in the US government is at a historic low (Pew, 2017a), a factor associated with increasing 
support for populism and anti-government sentiment (Pew, 2017b). In short, the extremity of 
attitudes, ideologies, and groups seem to be growing in influence, challenging peaceful co-
existence in democratic societies where compromise, reasoned debate, and civility appear to be 
on the wane.  
 Despite the growing threat posed by extreme groups, little research has focused on the 
persuasive communication strategies employed by such groups. Whether global jihadi networks, 
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nationalist movements, race supremacists, or anti-government activists, extreme groups rely on 
persuasive messaging operations, including the spread of conspiracy theories, fake news, calls 
for radicalization, and racist rhetoric. Many of these efforts have found success using non-
traditional avenues, such as social media, Internet message boards, and online streaming services 
(Blaker, 2015; Connelly et al., 2015; Farwell, 2014; Zeitzoff, 2018). As research has found, most 
extremists are not pathologically, mentally ill (Gage, 2011; Loza, 2007); to the contrary, the 
majority are quite capable of planning, organizing, and leading groups in complex operations, 
while giving the appearance of blending in and functioning normally within society. Thus, a 
pressing question becomes: What makes extreme, radical messages persuasive, not just to fellow 
believers, but to individuals in otherwise ordinary, mainstream populations?  
The psychological state in which individuals receive a persuasive message can influence 
their decoding behaviors in powerful ways. Experimental research shows that under conditions 
of existential threat (i.e., threats to one’s existence or sense of meaningfulness), extreme groups 
tend to become increasingly attractive (Hogg & Adelman, 2013; Kruglanski, Chen, Dechesne, 
Fishman, & Orehek, 2009). For example, studies in Australia and the US found college students 
under conditions of existential uncertainty identified with an extreme student group advocating 
radical action (Hogg, Meehan, & Farquarson, 2010; Massey, Miller, & Fisher, 2017). Similarly, 
research has shown that when made aware of their mortality, participants tend to express 
significantly greater levels of support for the use of extreme military force, and even suicidal 
religious martyrdom (Pyszczynski et al., 2006). In sum, existential threats involve aversive 
forces that motivate people to restore psychological equanimity, often by seeking out and 
identifying with extreme groups who may offer a measure of solace through their rigid social 
structure and ideology.  
  3 
Although research in psychology details ways in which threat motivates affiliation with 
extreme groups, this literature tends to focus on psychological variables (e.g., identification, 
behavioral intentions, and attitudes), and rarely, if ever, does it examine the persuasive appeal of 
extreme groups. As Jackson et al. (2019) note, there is consensus among intelligence and law 
enforcement agencies that greater scrutiny should be paid to the persuasive campaigns of 
extreme groups in order to counter domestic and international terrorism. And although recent 
communication research has considered the appeal of extreme groups from an interpretive lens 
(Bruscella & Bisel, 2018), such work does not draw on the considerable body of experimental 
research devoted to understanding the appeal of extreme groups. Thus, the present study 
addresses this gap in the literature by applying a communicative approach to examine key 
information-processing effects occurring when an individual receives a persuasive message from 
an extreme group under threat of self-uncertainty.  
Although psychological conditions affect message processing, sender attributes also 
influence persuasion (Hovland, Janis, & Kelly, 1953). Thus, the source characteristics of extreme 
groups should also be considered. Classic research in persuasion, for instance, finds receivers are 
predisposed to agree with sources they evaluate favorably, and disagree with those they view 
unfavorably (Eagly, 1983; Eagly & Chaiken, 1993). Similarly, message quality taps into 
receivers’ subjective evaluations of the quality of persuasive communication, with message 
quality found to moderate the effectiveness of persuasive appeals when the message topic aligns 
with receivers personal motivations (Updegraff, Sherman, Luyster, & Mann, 2007). With the 
exception of a handful of studies (see Connelly et al., 2015; Dunbar et al., 2014), assessments of 
source credibility and message quality are mostly absent from research on the influence of 
extreme groups. Measuring these critical source characteristics informs persuasion research 
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generally, while also enhancing and expanding research into the appeal of extreme groups. 
Along similar lines, measuring the strength of counterarguments produced by message 
receivers on behalf of the group can help assess persuasive effectiveness (Compton & Pfau, 
2005). Based on previous research examining the psychology of self-uncertainty and group 
extremism (Hogg et al., 2010), one would expect those experiencing self-uncertainty—and 
exposed to an extreme, relative to a moderate group—to be more likely to create more arguments 
in favor of the group’s positions. To the author’s knowledge, however, no studies have measured 
the number or quality of counterarguments produced in response to the persuasive appeals of 
extreme groups. And yet, on its face, a measure of successful group indoctrination should be 
evidenced by the ease with which adherents can effectively form counterarguments in opposition 
to group detractors, and in so doing, favor of the group. Again, this variable, typically used in 
attitude and persuasion research, adds to both the communication and social psychology 
literatures by measuring the success of extreme group at convincing, encouraging, and 
influencing their chosen targets 
Overall, understanding the persuasiveness of extreme groups requires two critical points 
of analysis: first, understanding the existential motivation to seek safety in groups when under 
uncertainty; and second, measuring the persuasiveness of extreme groups while receivers 
perceive themselves to be under threat. In explicating both points, this dissertation takes the 
position that the need to belong to social groups is a powerful motive in human affairs 
(Baumeister & Leary, 1995), and the stability of individuals’ identities, as well as their 
identifications, can affect their communication behaviors profoundly (Hogg, 2007; Kim, 2005, 
2006). Thus, in the following sections, a broad overview of the physical, psychological, and 
cultural benefits of social group membership are discussed. Following this general overview, 
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existential motivational theories are reviewed, with a special focus on research examining the 
motivational effects of existential anxiety and uncertainty. After reviewing this literature, a study 
rationale is presented centering on the persuasiveness of an extreme group when individuals are 
experiencing self-uncertainty. To begin, the benefits of social group membership are reviewed to 
provide a backdrop for better understanding of the persuasive appeal of extreme groups under 
conditions of existential threat.    
Existential Motivation and Persuasive Communication 
Cultural anthropologist Ernest Becker (1975) argued humans face an existential dilemma, 
as we are the only creatures with the cognitive ability to comprehend our own insignificance. As 
such, we face an overwhelmingly complex world in which our lifespan is quite minuscule, and 
our individual achievements relatively meaningless. According to Becker, humankind’s solution 
to the problem posed by this seeming insignificance is to seek ways to imbue life with meaning 
through the utility of culture. Culture provides meaning-making resources, and by adhering to 
the dictates of cultural systems, individuals are able to strive for and perhaps achieve some form 
of meaningful existence (Solomon, Greenberg, & Pyszczynski, 2004).  
As Becker asserts, the stability of one’s meaning-making systems, as well as the threats 
to meaningfulness one encounters as a relatively insignificant being, take on supreme 
importance. In particular, environmental factors that disrupt one’s self-conceptual clarity, or 
upend one’s psychological or social stability, represent potentially powerful threats to one’s 
understanding of self. As the self represents the organizational referent for individual action 
(Hogg, 2007), the destabilization of the self is an intensely threatening existential concern. As 
has been argued in philosophy (e.g., Kierkegaard, 1992/1846), cultural anthropology (e.g., 
Becker, 1975), and existential psychology (e.g., Greenberg, Pyszczynski, & Solomon, 1986), 
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having a firm sense of who one is, and where one stands, gives one’s life a vital sense of 
meaningfulness and purpose, without which the dread of one’s relative insignificance would be 
overwhelming.  
In this light, maintaining a stable perception of self-identity is a fundamental existential 
necessity. Destabilization of one’s identity motivates compensatory behaviors to reestablish 
equanimity. In the search for balance, the destabilized individual should be more attracted to 
social groups for the calming psychological benefits they provide (Dittes, 1959; Dittes & Kelly, 
1956; Hogg et al., 2010). Similarly, persuasive messages from such groups—particularly as 
expressed by their leaders—should be correspondingly more persuasive. Cast in this broader 
framework, the influence of extreme groups and the effectiveness of their persuasive messages 
can be understood in logically consistent ways. In essence, when the self-concept is undermined, 
individuals seek re-stabilization; and a primary means of finding stability comes with 
identification and membership within social groups capable of providing the myriad benefits 
necessary for securing one’s continued existence within a complex and threatening social 
environment (Hogg, 2007).  
Benefits of Social Group Membership 
Humans are social animals who depend on groups for survival. Successful functionality 
within the group depends heavily upon one’s social skills. The abilities to locate and identify 
oneself within a group have essential social and psychological consequences, as groups can 
provide security (Dittes, 1959; Dittes & Kelly, 1956), sense of identity (Tajfel, 1978; Tajfel & 
Turner, 1979), certainty (Hogg, 2007, 2011, 2014), and meaning-making systems (i.e., cultures; 
Miller & Massey, 2019), allowing one to understand chaotic social environments (Dechesne & 
Kruglanski, 2004). Maintaining a secure ingroup status provides evolutionary advantages 
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(Navarrete, Kurzban, Fessler, & Kirkpatrick, 2004) in terms of physical resources and behaviors 
(e.g., shared resources, mating opportunities, protection), as well as symbolic systems (e.g., 
culture) that aid in the encoding and creation as well as decoding and processing of symbols and 
messages. When one is exposed, threatened, or feels vulnerable to adverse conditions, the solace 
of ingroup memberships can afford a safe haven, physically, socially, psychologically, culturally, 
and, ultimately, existentially (Miller & Massey, 2019).  
Physical Advantages 
In terms of physical safety, forming coalitions is a matter of survival, as ancient humans 
relied on alliances to gather food and ward off physical threats (Buss, 1991). From an 
evolutionary perspective, behaviors that enhance group fitness provide adaptive utility over time, 
leading to the natural selection of communication behaviors designed to sustain group cohesion 
(Tooby, Cosmides, & Price, 2006). Research has found, for instance, that individuals who 
disrupt cohesion, or who violate group norms fail to contribute to the group adequately, and are 
subject to punitive retaliation—a mechanism that ensures the fluency of coordinated efforts 
(Williams, 2009).  
Along similar lines, humans have developed an innate bio-psychological sensitivity to 
inclusion cues, with the mere suggestion of ostracism being strong enough in many cases to 
trigger automatic responses, including negative affect (Williams, 2007) and reports of pain 
(Chen, Williams, Fitness, & Newton, 2008; MacDonald & Leary, 2005). Neuroimaging confirms 
the presence of a “neural alarm system” within the anterior cingulate cortex, activated by 
physical pain in response to social rejection (Eisenberger, Lieberman, & Williams, 2003, p. 291). 
In response to threats to the social attachment system, this same region is associated with reports 
of affective distress, indicating rejection is both physically and emotionally disturbing. Because 
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rejection and isolation can cause aversive physical and emotional pain, individuals have a strong 
motivation to engage in inclusion-seeking behaviors. Likewise, research into ostracism has found 
that, when isolation is induced, participants engage in concerted efforts to restore social ties 
(Case & Williams, 2004; Williams et al., 2002).  
Psychological Advantages 
Research in social psychology has demonstrated that humans have a powerful need to 
belong, which constitutes a fundamental and powerful motivation to seek affiliation (Baumeister 
& Leary, 1995; Maslow, 1943). The need to belong, however, may often clash with other 
impulses, especially the desire to gain recognition and status (Rank, 1978/1929, 1978/1936, 
1989/1932). These opposing motives constitute a dialectic comprised of distinctiveness and 
inclusion. When overly immersed in a collective, individuals may become motivated to express 
self-interest (i.e., distinctiveness), but if too isolated, they may become motivated to elevate 
group-based aspects of the self (Brewer, 1991). Vacillating between individual and group 
orientations is aimed at achieving optimal distinctiveness (see Brewer, 1991), a psychologically 
balanced state in which individuals can locate themselves satisfactorily outside, between, or 
within certain types of social groups (Brewer, 2003).  
Cultural Advantages  
Culture is a socially transmitted system of knowledge that prescribes norms and criteria 
for judgment (i.e., values; Keesing, 1974). Cultures relate humans to their social and physical 
environments while providing a framework for interpreting reality, including events that occur 
beyond the parameters of human cognition (e.g., death, the afterlife; Derchense & Kruglanski, 
2004). Culture is a powerful psychological referent given that culturally derived conceptions of 
reality can explain how the world works, and how one can achieve a meaningful life, and, thus, a 
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sense of self-worth (Arndt & Vess, 2008). Such systems rest on social consensus (Berger & 
Luckmann, 1967; Solomon, Greenberg, et al., 2004), making the maintenance and transmission 
of culture critical communicative and group-based processes. 
The internalization of cultural norms is necessary for the coordination of groups 
(Hallowell, 1956, 1963) as action is enhanced when individuals share normative expectations 
(McElreath, Boyd, & Richardson, 2003). Just as norm adherence facilitates greater capability for 
action, humans yield to norms under duress, most likely a byproduct of natural selection 
(Navarette et al., 2004). Indeed, research has demonstrated the compensatory motivation to 
bolster one’s cultural worldview (i.e., by elevating the ingroup or punishing the outgroup) when 
threatened with death (Greenberg et al., 1992), self-uncertainty (Van Den Bos, Euwema, 
Poortvliet, & Maas, 2007), feelings of insecurity (Massey et al., 2017), and meaning violations 
(Heine, Proulx, & Vohs, 2006). In short, groups support cultures, and cultures promote groups. 
Ultimately, individuals adhere to cultural norms to access cultural resources, especially during 
times of crisis.   
The loss of group membership means the loss of viable cultural systems, and, therefore, it 
bears on underlying existential concerns. Homo sapiens are unique in that we exchange symbols 
via communication to create meaning and construct frameworks for interpreting reality. The 
coherence and stability of our meaning-making systems are crucial to our ability to survive and 
thrive. Indeed, when accounting for human motivation, Maslow’s (1943, 1987) hierarchy of 
needs lists self-actualization and meaning making at the peak—as the highest level of human 
growth and attainment. The ability to make meaning is a chief concern for humans whose 
advanced cognitive capacities allow them to account for otherwise overwhelmingly complex 
physical and social environments.  
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In summary, humans are social animals who depend on group membership for survival. 
From an evolutionary perspective, conformity to group norms provides physical benefits (e.g., 
resources/protection) and helps individuals manage and maintain a psychological equilibrium 
between inclusivity and distinctiveness. As the province of groups, cultural worldviews provide 
the frameworks allowing members to share understanding and make sense of the world. At the 
same time, internalizing and adhering to cultural norms help maintain social harmony and 
coordinate actions necessary for group survival. Together, the cultural, psychological, and 
physical benefits of group conformity compel the existential need for group membership, both as 
a legacy of evolutionary adaptation and as a means for imbuing life with meaning, thereby, 
according to Becker (1975), warding off the existential terror of human existence. When 
existential threats—such as self-uncertainty—disrupt individuals’ understanding of themselves 
and their place in the world, social groups become increasingly essential for individuals’ 
physical, psychological, and cultural equanimity. 
Thesis 
Working from the above assumptions, this dissertation will examine certain key 
information-processing effects encountered when an individual receives a persuasive message 
from an extreme group under conditions of existential uncertainty. Focusing on threat-induced 
message processing extends the research on understanding the attractiveness of extreme groups. 
Although in some cases research has found attitude extremism to be a function of social 
networks (Binder, Dalrymple, Brossard, & Scheufele, 2009), the majority of studies in this area 
have focused on drive states motivating individuals to identify with extreme groups. Such states 
include the need to reduce uncertainty (Hogg, 2007), buffer existential anxiety (Pyszczynski et 
al., 2006), reach a satisfied social identity (Tajifel & Turner, 1979, 1986), and/or find personal 
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significance (Kruglanski et al., 2009), all of which may be thought of as existential concerns, 
given how they relate to the human need to understand existence and live a meaningful life 
within that understanding. Although some interpretive research has examined the communication 
processes of extreme groups (Bruscella & Bisel, 2018), an experimental design is required to 
isolate specific communication variables and control the manipulation of existential threat along 
with various threats to validity. Hence, this dissertation uses a controlled experimental design to 
focus on the information processing effected by individuals receiving a persuasive 
communication from an extreme (versus moderate) group, while under the influence of 
existential threat.       
In the following chapters, pertinent literature relevant to research examining the 
existential threat of self-uncertainty is reviewed. This body of research presents evidence that, 
when threatened with uncertainty about the self, individuals become motivated to seek solace in 
social groups. Though this general finding is empirically supported by research, there are 
theoretical disagreements as to which specific mechanisms underpin group identification. 
Furthermore, research is specifically needed to comprehend the unique persuasive appeal of 
extreme groups to individuals. To better understand the relationship between existential motives 
and the persuasive effect of extreme messages, the extensive literature detailing the effects of 
self-uncertainty on individuals’ motivation to join extreme groups is reviewed next.  
 
 
 
 
 
  
  12 
Chapter 2: Literature Review 
A number of theoretical models have produced research findings arriving at a common 
conclusion: Uncertainty about one’s attitudes, knowledge, feelings, and perceptions is an 
aversive experience that motivates uncertainty-reduction behaviors (Hogg, 2007; Jost, Glaser, 
Kruglanski, & Sulloway, 2003a; Landau, Rothschild, & Sullivan, 2012; Sorrentino, Ye, & Szeto, 
2009; Van den Bos, 2009). Since a person can never gain complete certainty in life, uncertainty 
can never be totally eliminated, making uncertainty-reduction a panhuman endeavor (Hogg, 
2007), with stable differences in uncertainty orientations manifesting individually (Sorrentino et 
al., 2009) as well as cross-culturally (Hofstede, 1980).  
As Hogg (2007) has noted, uncertainty can be operationalized along epistemic and 
affective dimensions. Epistemic uncertainty relates to knowledge about events, and tends to 
focus on information that makes one uncertain. Affective uncertainty is diffuse, as one can feel 
uncertain without being able to articulate why. Van den Bos (2009) has made a similar 
distinction between personal-uncertainty as a hot-cognitive process (e.g., visceral, intuitive, and 
affective) and informational uncertainty as a cold-cognitive process (e.g., reasoned, rationalistic, 
and cognitive). Epistemic/informational uncertainty is focused, information-oriented, and related 
to confidence in decision-making. Affective/personal uncertainty is diffuse, emotive, and can be 
held in conscious or non-conscious awareness.    
Uncertainty relevant to one’s identity or sense of self is a key construct in several theories 
offering predictions about why individuals are attracted to extreme groups. This section begins 
with a review of UIT (Hogg, 2007) before discussing the uncertainty-threat model (UTM) of 
political extremism (Jost & Napier, 2012). These frameworks make competing predictions about 
how people react to extreme groups. The key difference lies in the role of ideology. Hogg’s 
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theory argues that extreme groups are attractive to individuals experiencing self-uncertainty. In 
this case, the ideology of the group does not matter so much as the extremity of the group’s 
orientation, with more rigidly structured groups providing a sense of stability and order to 
uncertain individuals. Jost and Napier’s model holds that politically conservative individuals 
have a greater need to reduce uncertainty, and thus, when made uncertain, find extreme groups 
with clear positions to be relatively more attractive (e.g., as with nationalism and right-wing 
authoritarianism). From this perspective, the individual’s ideology is particularly important, as is 
the group’s. Both frameworks focus on psychological variables, such as self-uncertainty, need 
for cognitive closure, and death anxiety. However, neither theory focuses on communication 
variables, such as source credibility and message quality, or receiver cognitive processes, such as 
active counterarguing. Assessing key persuasion outcomes alongside psychological constructs 
helps better capture the persuasive appeal of extreme groups, as well as individual motivations to 
affiliate with such groups. Accordingly, this dissertation tests competing predictions of UIT and 
UTM with a focus on communication variables, and the persuasive influence of extreme relative 
to moderate groups.     
Uncertainty Identity Theory 
Premised in social identity theory (SIT; Tajifel & Turner, 1986; Turner, Hogg, Oakes, 
Reicher, & Wetherell, 1987), Hogg’s (2007, 2011, 2014) UIT posits uncertainty about the self 
motivates people to identify with social groups. Within UIT, the self is conceptualized as the 
“critical organizing principle, referent point, or integrative framework for perceptions, feelings, 
and behaviors” (Hogg, 2007, p. 77). According to Hogg, when uncertain about the self, people 
are less able to function in their environment, and, consequently, they become motivated to 
stabilize their self-concept.   
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According to UIT, a potent means of eliminating self-uncertainty is identifying with 
groups. A unique property of groups is the provision of prototypes for their members. The term 
prototype describes social categories that “embody all and any attributes that define the category 
and distinguish it from other categories in a specific context” (Hogg, 2007, p. 79). Group-based 
prototypes prescribe normative expectations for behavior. Adhering to such expectations 
accentuates the similarity of ingroup members, while simultaneously differentiating outgroup 
members (Hogg, 2014). To this end, self-categorization helps clarify the definition of the self, 
thereby reducing self-uncertainty in the process.  
Not all groups share the same uncertainty-reducing functions, however. As Hogg (2004) 
notes, groups high in what he terms entitativity are better suited to reduce self-uncertainty. Hogg 
describes entitativity as, “the property of a group, resting on clear boundaries, internal 
homogeneity, social interaction, clear internal structure, common goals, and common fate” 
(Hogg, 2012, p. 23). According to UIT, groups high in entitativity should be more attractive to 
individuals experiencing self-conceptual uncertainty given that such groups provide clear 
identity roles. Experimental research has demonstrated that, relative to those primed with self-
certainty, those primed with self-uncertainty are significantly more attracted to groups high in 
entitativity (Hogg et al., 2007; Hogg et al., 2010).  
Groups high in entitativity are characterized as extreme in nature, as group structure—
such as rigid boundaries, internal homogeneity, belief in a common fate—is a function of the 
group’s ideology. The term ideology describes a mental model or set of beliefs regarding how the 
world should work (Van Dijk, 2006). Ideologies are unique in the sense that people evoke 
socially shared beliefs to express personal opinions (Kim, 2011). By accepting the parameters of 
an ideology, individuals acquiesce to social and intellectual constraints espoused by the group 
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(Kim, 2011). A group high in entitativity, for instance, is structurally rigid but also ideologically 
rigid as members are expected to conform to a singular vision and shared fate.  
Research using social network analysis has highlighted the connection between rigid 
group structure and opinion conformity. Friedkin (1993), for instance, notes that cohesive groups 
have a distinct network structure, defined by high connectivity between members and greater 
network density. Within such a structure, members are likely to be aware of one another’s views, 
and information diffuses quickly, meaning members are aware of opinions that clash with the 
majority. Such a network encourages uniformity of opinion and grants significant power to 
leaders who are located at the center of these highly connected and dense networks (Friedkin, 
1993).  
Recent research has examined the role of homogenous networks on attitude extremism. 
For example, Binder et al. (2009) found homogenous discussion networks predict extreme 
attitudes on political issues. In this case, participants whose social networks were comprised of 
politically similar others expressed more extreme opinions on social issues (e.g., stem cell 
research) relative to those whose social networks were more heterogeneous. Along similar lines, 
Warner (2010) exposed participants to homogeneous partisan (i.e., conservative, liberal, or 
moderate) media (e.g., op-eds, news media, and comments sections) to determine if homogeneity 
predicted attitude extremism. Warner found exposure to homogeneous, partisan media did 
increase attitude extremity, but only for conservative participants.   
Taken together, several different perspectives provide evidence that the structure of a 
social group influences the opinions and attitudes of members. Tightly organized groups with 
rigid boundaries encourage conformity in thought and behavior. Members within such groups are 
highly connected, and thus, more aware of dissenting opinions. The more densely connected the 
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network, the more likely members feel pressure to reach a unanimous opinion. Communication 
between members within this type of network can lead to attitude extremity (Binder et al., 2009). 
Similarly, mere exposure to homogeneous networks can encourage attitude extremity on social 
issues (Warner, 2010).   
From the UIT perspective, a group high in entitativity reflects a more rigid, tightly 
organized hierarchy, in which members are expected to conform to a singular vision. Such 
groups can be conceptualized as extreme in orientation, both structurally and ideologically, and 
according to UIT, should be more attractive to those experiencing self-uncertainty. 
Self-Uncertainty: Support for Extreme Groups and Radical Behavior 
The link between persuasion and extremism posited by UIT is straightforward: Self-
uncertainty motivates people to reduce uncertainty by identifying with groups. The more 
entitative the group, the more attractive it becomes. As highly entitative groups are extreme in 
orientation, under conditions of self-uncertainty, extreme groups become increasingly more 
attractive.     
In a notable finding, Hogg et al. (2010) demonstrated that college students identified with 
and expressed behavioral intentions to act on behalf of a radical group after being primed with 
self-uncertainty. In this study, participants read about an unpopular tuition increase and then 
watched a video interview with representatives from a student group responding to the hike. 
Participants were randomly assigned to see either a moderate or radical group. In the video, the 
student group leaders were confederates, and extremity was operationalized as high versus low 
entitativity, which was manipulated by presenting the low entitativity, or moderate group as 
open, with weak boundaries, heterogeneous membership, and flexible ideology, and the high 
entitativity or extreme group as rigid, with hard boundaries, homogenous membership, and rigid 
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ideology. The moderate leaders offered a measured response to the increase, emphasizing reason 
and advocating dialogue with the administration. The extreme leaders proposed radical action, 
such as protests, walkouts, and sit-ins. After the video, participants were primed with self-
certainty or self-uncertainty, and then asked to fill out dependent measures consisting of 
identification with the group and behavioral intentions to act on behalf of the group.  
Hogg et al. (2010) found that relative to those in the self-certainty condition, those 
primed with self-uncertainty identified significantly more with the radical group. Furthermore, 
participants in the self-uncertainty condition indicated greater behavioral intentions to act on 
behalf of the radical group. These results provide validation for UIT, asserting that the more 
uncertain the person, the more attractive the group, especially when it is advocating radical 
behavior (Hogg, 2012).       
In summary, UIT posits that self-uncertainty motivates individuals to identify with groups. 
The more tightly structured the group, the more attractive it appears to the uncertain person. The 
logic of UIT suggests extremely rigid groups should be maximally attractive to uncertain 
individuals, regardless of ideological orientation (Hogg, 2005, 2007). According to UIT, the 
ideological orientation of the group is not necessarily a motivating factor for identification, what 
matters is the extremity of ideology, in general. In contrast, other uncertainty models claim 
ideological conviction is instrumental in predicting uncertainty-reduction behaviors.    
The Uncertainty-Threat Model of Political Extremism 
 The UTM holds that the need to reduce uncertainty is “associated with political 
conservatism in particular and not ideological extremity in general” (Jost & Napier, 2012, p. 91). 
This model supposes politically conservative individuals—compared to liberal counterparts—are 
more uncomfortable with uncertainty and threat (e.g., death anxiety, system instability, and fear 
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of threat and loss), and thus, more motivated to reduce both. One means of reducing uncertainty 
is adherence to rigid ideological positions and support for authoritarian action (see Tetlock, 
1989; rigidity of the right hypothesis). According to the UTM, political conservatism, and not 
ideological extremism (in either direction), predicts support for rigid ideological commitment 
due to the unique epistemic and existential needs associated with conservatism (cf. Greenberg & 
Jonas, 2003, who contend rigid ideologies buffer uncertainty equally for liberals and 
conservatives).     
The UTM is supported by two extensive meta-analyses (Jost et al., 2003a; Jost, Glaser, 
Kruglanski, & Sulloway, 2003b) of published research dating from 1950 to 2003 identifying 
predictors for political conservatism. Political conservatism had an inverse relationship with 
openness to experience, such that, as scores for conservative ideology increased, scores for 
openness decreased. Further, openness to experience was a negative predictor for social 
dominance (Pratto et al., 1994), right-wing authoritarianism (Peterson et al., 1997; Peterson & 
Lane, 2001), systems justification (Jost & Thompson, 2000)—uncertainty tolerance, integrative 
complexity, and threats to self-esteem (e.g., false feedback about failure; Sales & Friend, 1973). 
Conversely, dogmatism, death anxiety, system instability, intolerance of ambiguity, as well as 
need for structure, order, and closure, all positively predict conservatism, with death anxiety and 
system threat as the strongest predictors. These meta-analytic results support a profile suggesting 
politically conservative individuals have unique epistemic (e.g., need for closure) and existential 
(e.g., fear of death) needs to reduce uncertainty and alleviate threat.   
Ideological Conservatism as Motivated Social Cognition 
The UTM framework defines conservatism as “an ideological belief system that consists 
of two core components, resistance to change and opposition to equality, which serve to reduce 
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uncertainty and threat” (Jost & Napier, 2012, p. 92; cf. Haidt & Joseph, 2007). As Jost et al. 
(2003a) argued, resistance to change and opposition to equality are psychologically linked. 
Resistance to change, for instance, involves a desire to retain the status quo or return to 
traditional customs. In this view, most social hierarchies are said to be organized in an 
inequitable manner, and since they are assumed to have always been so organized, the return to 
tradition thus represents a return to inequality. Therefore, from a UTM perspective, resistance to 
change is equivalent to defense of inequality.   
The relationship between political conservatism, uncertainty, and persuasion is fairly 
straightforward in the UTM: Under conditions of uncertainty, politically conservative individuals 
should find conservative leaders, beliefs, and attitudes more persuasive (Jost & Napier, 2012). 
The motivation to reduce uncertainty is a greater concern for politically conservative individuals 
and less so for liberals. As Berger and Calabrese (1974) have theorized, the need to reduce 
uncertainty is a near universal human motivation. Yet, although individuals are driven to reduce 
uncertainty, some have a greater need to be certain than others. In this view, conservative 
individuals are also more likely to be threat-averse compared to liberals, as evidenced by Jost et 
al. (2003a) who found several threat-related variables (e.g., death anxiety, system instability, and 
fear of threat and loss) positively predictive of political conservatism but not liberalism. 
Although evidence for the UTM rests on individual differences in epistemic and 
existential needs, the framework also implies that, relative to their liberal counterparts,  
conservative ideologies may be more attractive under conditions of social, intergroup, or 
existential threat (see Bonanno & Jost, 2006). Research utilizing death anxiety as an 
intervention—a key construct in both UTM meta-analyses (Jost et al., 2003a; Jost et al., 
2003b)—has shown increased support for conservative leaders when participants were made 
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death aware via reminders about terrorism. This induction crossed ideological lines, as increased 
support for a conservative leader was found amongst liberal and conservative participants, with 
greater positive change in attitude for liberals towards a conservative leader compared to 
conservatives for the same leader (Landau et al., 2004; see also Greenberg et al., 1992), a finding 
Jost and colleagues (e.g., Bonanno & Jost, 2006; Jost et al., 2007; Jost & Napier, 2012) appear to 
incorrectly cite as evidence in support of the UTM. 
Threat and Uncertainty: Conservatism, Not Extremism 
To determine the latent structure of the UTM, Jost et al. (2007) conducted three studies in 
Texas, Massachusetts, and New York. In the first study, more conservative participants in Texas 
completed surveys designed to measure political self-placement and uncertainty/threat 
orientations. To measure uncertainty, items were drawn from Big Five personality inventories, 
specifically, the contentious and openness dimensions. Threat was measured using Wong et al.’s 
(1994) death anxiety scale. Finally, political ideology was assessed with only a single self-report 
item anchored by 1 = very liberal, and 9 = very conservative. Structural equation modeling 
(SEM) found support for the UTM, as uncertainty avoidance and threat both positively predicted 
political conservatism, whereas neither was associated with ideological extremism in either 
liberal or conservative ends of the ideological scale. 
In study 2, the researchers tested the same SEM, this time drawing data from a 
predominately liberal sample in Massachusetts. In this case, participants completed 
questionnaires designed to capture political self-placement as well as uncertainty and threat 
management orientations. Uncertainty avoidance was measured using sub-scales from the 
personal need for closure inventory (Webster & Kruglanski, 1994), whereas threat and political 
orientation were captured using the same items as the Texas study. The SEM again revealed 
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uncertainty avoidance and threat to be reliable predictors of political conservatism. Interestingly, 
however, in this model, uncertainty orientation had a significant inverse relationship with 
ideological extremism; which is to say, as uncertainty avoidance increased, ideological 
extremism decreased, providing additional evidence for inter-relationships between uncertainty 
avoidance, political conservatism, and ideological extremism.    
Greenberg and Jonas (2003) criticized Jost and colleagues’ definition of conservatism 
and the notion that extreme ideologies primarily appeal to politically conservative individuals. 
Jost et al. (2007) responded by including resistance to change and opposition to inequality within 
the SEMs in their Study 3, in which uncertainty avoidance was measured using need for 
cognitive closure, threat was captured using perceptions-of-dangerous-world scales (Duckitt, 
Wagner, du Plessis, & Birum, 2002), need for stability/order was used to capture resistance to 
change, and opposition to equality items were borrowed from inequality research (Kluegel & 
Smith, 1986). The resulting SEM for Study 3 tested relationships between opposition to equality, 
resistance to change, uncertainty avoidance, and political orientation (whereas Studies 1 and 2 
only examined uncertainty avoidance, reactions to threat, and conservatism).  
The expanded SEM found the relationship between uncertainty avoidance and political 
orientation to be completely mediated by resistance to change. That is, the direct path from 
uncertainty avoidance to political conservatism was nonsignificant with resistance to change in 
the model—a departure from Studies 1 and 2. The relationship between threat and political 
orientation, however, was only partially mediated by opposition to equality, as the threat variable 
had a significant direct path to conservatism, a finding similar to earlier models. Overall, 
uncertainty avoidance was significantly related to resistance to change, which positively 
predicted self-reported conservatism (as assessed by the single item), showing full mediation. 
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Additionally, threat positively predicted self-reported conservatism, along with opposition to 
equality, which positively predicted political orientation, revealing opposition to equality to be a 
partial mediator.  
 Altogether, findings from multiple studies along with two meta-analyses produced 
support for the UTM, and Jost et al.’s (2003a) predictions concerning the association between 
existential threat, uncertainty, and conservatism. In sum, the UTM holds that political beliefs 
(i.e., resistance to change and opposition to equality) are motivated by epistemic needs (e.g., 
cognitive closure) and existential needs (e.g., death anxiety) that reflect individual differences 
(e.g., dogmatism) but also manifest in response to situational contexts (e.g., system instability). 
Overall, the UTM predicts threat and uncertainty should disproportionally motivate politically 
conservative individuals to reduce uncertainty and engage in behaviors aimed at eliminating the 
source of threat. Similarly, conservative individuals should be relatively more sensitive to 
potential threats. 
Challenges to the UTM 
Greenberg and Jonas (2003) have challenged the premises of the UTM, arguing that the 
need to reduce uncertainty can be met by endorsing any extreme ideology, whether conservative 
or liberal. In their view, the utility of ideological extremity is simple: Rigid worldviews provide 
certainty, as they present a sharp, black-and-white vision of the world, often prescribing rigid 
expectations for individual behavior, as well as making prohibitions clear and delineating 
boundaries between groups. Thus, under conditions of uncertainty, a rigid left-wing ideology 
should be just as uncertainty reducing for liberals as extreme right-wing ideology should be for 
conservatives.  
In support of this formulation, Greenberg and Jonas (2003) noted how totalitarian 
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Communist states (e.g., Soviet Russia; Maoist China; the Kim dynasty in North Korea) exhibit 
all the hallmarks of right-wing dictatorships (e.g., Nazi Germany; Fascist Italy; Pinochet in 
Chile), suggesting there is little difference between extreme left and extreme right ideologies 
when they become manifest as governing philosophies. Moreover, many leftist regimes come to 
power through popular uprisings in response to high levels of social uncertainty (e.g., the 
overthrow of the Romanov dynasty by Bolsheviks during WWI; the Cuban revolution in the 
1950s), indicating uncertainty can drive leftists to radical action. Citing several other such 
historical examples, Greenberg and Jonas (2003) argue extreme leftist ideologies serve the same 
uncertainty-reduction functions as right-wing ideologies (e.g., Patty Hearst’s conversion by the 
Symbionese Liberation Army in 1974).  
Individual-level data has shown scores on authoritarianism (i.e., a concept associated 
with conservatism in US social sciences) in former Communist countries (e.g., Bulgaria) to be 
higher amongst respondents than in capitalistic, Democratic countries (e.g., the US; Larsen, 
Groberg, & Simmons, 1993). As Greenberg and Jonas (2003) argue, acceptance of 
authoritarianism is not a function of one ideology, but instead, a means of reducing uncertainty 
regardless of political ideology. The direction of ideology (right vs. left) is only important to the 
degree relevant beliefs are accepted in society. Authoritarianism should be attractive to 
individuals across the political spectrum when they are made to feel uncertain. Thus, 
authoritarianism can manifest in both conservative and liberal societies.  
Greenberg and Jonas (2003) agree with Jost et al. (2003a, 2003b) that ideological rigidity 
serves to reduce uncertainty and threat. However, contrary to the UTM, and based on a terror 
management theory perspective (TMT; Greenberg, Pyszczynski, & Solomon, 1986), Greenberg 
and Jonas’ (2003) contentions rest on a body of experimental research demonstrating how 
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existential threat can motivate individuals to seek psychological balance and the alleviation of 
anxiety by bolstering their cultural worldview, which can vary greatly depending on the 
individuals’ ideological commitment to their ideals, whether liberal, conservative, or otherwise. 
This dissertation, then, adopts Greenberg and Jonas’ (2003) formulation, which contends that 
under conditions of existential threat and self-uncertainty, perceived group extremity can 
function to buffer the potential for existential anxiety, regardless of the individual’s political 
ideology. 
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Chapter 3: Present Research 
Given that one’s self construct is the principal organizational referent for action, self-
uncertainty represents a primary existential threat, the alleviation of which is motivated by the 
need to firmly locate one’s self construct securely within both the physical and social 
environments. Uncertainty about identity and social standing undermines the ability to find 
and/or create personal meaning in one’s existence. Under existential threat, people become 
increasingly attracted to social groups due to their physical, psychological, and cultural meaning-
making benefits. When one is in a state of self-uncertainty, extreme groups and their high 
entitative leaders should become increasingly more psychologically attractive as message 
sources, and potentially more persuasive in their advocacy of more extreme positions and actions 
relative to their moderate counterparts.    
As an experimental framework for explicating these relationships, this dissertation draws 
upon Hogg et al.’s (2010) application of UIT, wherein college students were informed about a 
tuition increase and exposed to either an extreme or moderate student group, ostensibly formed 
in response to the increase, before being primed with self-uncertainty. Relative to those in the 
certainty condition, Hogg and colleagues found college students in the uncertainty condition 
identified with the radical group significantly more. Further, those in the uncertainty condition 
also expressed greater intentions to act on behalf of the extreme group than those in the moderate 
group. Their results provided support for the UIT assertion that extreme groups become 
increasingly attractive to self-uncertain individuals. Moreover, their findings aligned with the 
position put forth by Greenberg and Jonas’ (2003) that the attractiveness of radical groups is not 
necessarily a function of one’s ideological orientation.  
More recently, Massey et al. (2017) replicated Hogg et al.’s (2010) original study, 
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employing a 2 (source: extreme vs. moderate) × 4 (induction: self-certain, self-uncertain, 
identity-security, identity-insecurity) independent group design, which also tested alternative 
explanations for Hogg et al.’s (2010) results. Following the general approach used by TMT 
researchers to manipulate mortality salience, in the self-certain/-uncertain conditions, 
participants were asked to write about three things that made them feel certain or uncertain about 
themselves. Similarly, within the identity-security/insecurity conditions, participants were asked 
to provide the name of an important social group, then to write two essays about either being 
rejected and outcast (i.e., identity insecurity) or accepted and included (i.e., identity security) by 
that social group.  
Massey et al. (2017) were able to reproduce Hogg et al.’s (2010) effects on identification, 
wherein participants in the self-uncertainty condition showed greater identification with the 
radical group compared to students in the self-certainty condition. However, there were no 
significant differences between self-certainty/uncertainty effects on behavioral intentions. The 
same pattern was found for identity-security/insecurity; relative to those in the secure condition, 
those made to feel insecure identified more with the radical group. However, there again were no 
significant effects for behavioral intentions.  
In sum, the results from Massey et al. (2017) indicate those in the self-uncertain and 
identity-insecure conditions identified with an extreme student group more than those in self-
certain and identity-secure conditions, with no significant differences on behavioral intentions 
regardless of condition, suggesting none of the subjects showed an apparent willingness to act on 
behalf of the group. Given the sample was drawn from a relatively conservative student 
population, the actions advocated by the group (e.g., sit-ins, walk outs, loud demonstrations) may 
have been more akin to the student activism of the 1960’s. That is to say, although the groups 
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were not described in terms of their ideology, they did advocate radical campus activism, which 
may have violated a conservative worldview. However, Massey et al. (2017) did not measure 
ideology, so it is unclear why participants may have identified with an extreme group but not 
indicated a desire to act on that group’s behalf.  
Although Massey et al. (2017) provided support for Hogg’s UIT model, and successfully 
replicated Hogg et al.’s (2010) experimental design; their study did little to advance research into 
the effects of self-uncertainty on outcomes more relevant and specific to social influence and 
persuasion. In their replication, Massey et al. (2017) included the same two outcome variables 
used in Hogg et al. (2010): identification with the group and behavioral intentions towards the 
group. The persuasive appeal of the group, including relevant communication variables, such as 
source credibility, message quality, attitudes change, and counterargument generation, were not 
considered. However, the general model used in the replication did provide a pilot test for an 
experimental extension of Massey et al.’s (2017) results, useful in determining whether 
existential motivation in the form of self-uncertainty can enhance the persuasiveness of an 
extreme student group relative to a moderate one. Building on Hogg et al. (2010) and Massey et 
al. (2017), this dissertation utilizes the same extreme group manipulation but expands the design 
to measure and test several key communication variables of interest.  
Hypotheses and Research Questions 
The UIT holds individuals reduce self-uncertainty by identifying with social groups. 
Several studies have supported this finding; in both Hogg et al. (2010) and Massey et al. (2017), 
identification was stronger for the moderate group relative to the extreme group. In both Hogg et 
al. (2010) and Massey et al. (2017) the extreme group was operationalized as rigid, demanding, 
harsh and unreasonable. Comparatively, the moderate group was operationalized as loose, open 
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to newcomers, the leaders reasonable and accommodating. In both studies, the moderate group 
was described as more attractive compared to the extreme group, in both the self-certain and self-
uncertain conditions. Per UIT, this outcome is expected. Only under conditions of self-
uncertainty would group entitativity motivate identification. In other words, under relatively 
normal conditions, in which one is not experiencing self-uncertainty, high entitativity (i.e., 
extreme) groups should be less attractive than low entitativity groups (i.e., moderate). This 
reasoning forms the basis for the following hypothesis:  
H1: There is a main effect for perceived group extremism such that, relative to an 
extreme group, exposure to a moderate group results in higher (a) identification, (b) 
behavioral intentions to act on behalf of the group, (c) perceptions of source 
credibility, (d) positive attitudes toward the advocated position, and (e) favorable 
perceptions of message quality.  
Massey et al. (2017) found differences on identification towards a social group 
(regardless of relative extremity or moderation) when comparing self-certainty versus self-
uncertainty. This finding aligns with the UIT, and mirrors Hogg et al.’s (2010) finding, as well as 
other recent studies utilizing self-uncertainty manipulations (Hohman & Hogg, 2015; Hohman, 
Gaffney, & Hogg, 2017). Therefore, the following hypothesis is posited: 
H2: There is a main effect for perceived self-uncertainty such that, relative to self-
certainty, self-uncertainty increases (a) group identification, (b) behavioral intentions 
to act on behalf of the group, (c) perceptions of source credibility, (d) positive 
attitudes toward the advocated position, and (e) favorable perceptions of message 
quality.  
Within the UIT framework, extreme groups only increase in attractiveness under 
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conditions of self-uncertainty, as self-certain individuals should not be as motivated to seek 
safety with groups high in entitativity compared to self-uncertain individuals. Indeed, Hogg et al. 
(2010) found a two-way interaction between self-uncertainty and group extremism, such that 
there were no differences between self-certainty and self-uncertainty on identification with the 
moderate group. However, there were significant differences between self-certainty and self-
uncertainty when participants were exposed to an extreme group. In this case, relative to self-
certainty, self-uncertainty predicted greater identification with the extreme group. To date, no 
studies have tested Hogg’s Self-uncertainty × Group Extremism interaction using 
communication variables as the dependent measures. Assuming, as UIT posits, that increased 
self-uncertainty fosters a preference for groups high in entitativity—and, therefore, perceived as 
more extreme—the following interaction is hypothesized: 
H3: Self-uncertainty interacts with perceived group extremity such that in the extreme 
group condition, relative to self-certainty, self-uncertainty increases (a) 
identification, (b) behavioral intentions to act on behalf of the group, (c) perceptions 
of source credibility, (d) positive attitudes toward the advocated position, and (e) 
favorable perceptions of message quality, whereas in the moderate condition, there is 
no difference between self-certainty and self-uncertainty on any of these outcome 
variables.  
Massey et al. (2017) provided support for Hogg’s UIT framework by showing how self-
uncertainty can result in higher identification with a radical group. However, the radical student 
group in Massey et al. (2017) espoused no ideological positions, but rather, only radical 
advocacy. One possible way to address this issue, to better understand the persuasiveness of 
extreme groups, would be to measure participant ideology during a pretest, and then randomly 
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assign ideology (liberal/conservative) to the student group source to thereby assess whether 
shared/not-shared ideology (i.e., congruence of ideological positions between source and 
receiver) influences the way self-uncertain participants will react to extreme versus moderate 
messages.  
As noted, there is a lack of theoretical consensus regarding the relationship between 
existential uncertainty and the appeal of extreme groups. Hogg’s UIT argues group structure, not 
ideology, mediates identification with radical groups. Any extreme group should reduce 
uncertainty by allowing followers to form themselves into more clearly distinctive and rigid 
belief systems. Thus, from the UIT perspective, one’s initial ideological position should be 
irrelevant—groups are expected to provide solace to uncertain individuals regardless of 
ideological direction. Based on this perspective, there should be no difference between liberals 
and conservatives with respect to groups attraction under conditions of uncertainty.  
The UTM, however, holds that conservatives have a unique set of epistemic and 
existential motives apart from their liberal counterparts. In particular, conservatives are thought 
to be more threat-averse and likely to express a greater need for certainty. If the UTM is correct, 
this sensitivity to threat and uncertainty should make conservatives more susceptible to rigid 
ideologies, such as right-wing authoritarianism and need for closure (Jost et al., 2003a; Jost et al., 
2003b; Jost & Napier, 2012). Based on this body of research, conservatives should be more 
attracted to likeminded conservative groups under conditions of uncertainty. 
Furthermore, Greenberg and Jonas (2003) have posited that any extreme ideology will 
help to reduce uncertainty, regardless of ideological orientation. According to their view, 
attitudes such as ingroup favoritism, outgroup prejudice, ethnocentrism, submission to authority, 
derogation of dissimilar others, nationalism, jingoism, support for extreme military actions, and 
  31 
support for authoritarian leaders are facets of extreme ideologies on both the left and the right 
sides of the political spectrum. Citing historical and survey evidence, the authors assert extreme 
ideologies and the groups who espouse them should be able to reduce uncertainty for liberals and 
conservatives alike. The question may hinge upon what the dominant ideology within a society is 
perceived to be. Should chronic social uncertainty focus its grip upon a left-leaning society, 
Greenberg and Jonas argue left-wing authoritarianism (e.g., Communist totalitarianism) should 
be effective at reducing uncertainty. Likewise, should chronic social uncertainty take hold of a 
right-leaning society, then right-wing authoritarianism (e.g., Fascist totalitarianism) should be 
effective at reducing uncertainty. 
As to the systems that motivate conservative versus liberal ideological groups, Haidt and 
Graham’s (2007) moral foundations theory (MFT) argues five moral foundations underpin 
human psychology. These foundations include harm (i.e., protecting others from harm), fairness 
(i.e., advocating procedural and social justice), ingroup loyalty (i.e., patriotism, nationalism, and 
distrust of outsiders), authority (i.e., respect for authority and disdain for subversion), and purity 
(i.e., disgust for violations of bodily or social norms). Haidt and Graham (2007) argue cultures 
develop virtues based on these five foundations, and individuals socialized within such cultures 
come to adopt a worldview, or political ideology, accordingly. 
In particular, MFT finds liberal virtues are associated with harm and fairness foundations, 
meaning liberals value protecting others from harm, often by focusing on procedural and social 
justice. Conservative virtues, however, are derived from all five foundations, meaning liberal 
virtues (i.e., derived from harm and fairness) comprise a smaller portion of a conservative 
worldview (Haidt & Joseph, 2004). Based on this distinction, MFT posits liberal groups are more 
likely to focus on issues of equality and justice, and should be less offended by dissent, less wary 
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of diversity, and less committed to enforcing social mores. Similarly, conservative groups are 
described as valuing ingroup loyalty, respect for authority, disdain of subversion, and greater 
disgust with purity violations.  
Measuring ideological orientation could help determine if ideological congruence 
between sender and receiver influences the sender’s adjustment to the group. In this regard, UIT 
and UTM offer different predictions. Whereas UIT argues group structure and self-uncertainty 
interact to motivate group identification, UTM claims ideology in general, and political 
conservatism in particular, predicts support for extremism. Conversely, Greenberg and Jonas 
(2003) have argued that liberals and conservatives can support an extreme group as long as the 
group confirms adherents’ ideological worldview. This dissertation takes the latter positions, and 
thus, the following hypothesis is proposed: 
H4: Ideology predicts greater (a) identification, (b) behavioral intentions to act on behalf 
of the group, (c) perceptions of source credibility, (d) positive attitudes towards the 
advocated position, and (e) favorable perceptions of message quality with an 
ideologically congruent group. 
If source ideology (liberal/conservative) is fully crossed with group type 
(extreme/moderate source) and self-certainty induction (self-certain/self-uncertain), some self-
uncertain participants will be exposed to radical groups that do not share their ideology. In such a 
case, some literature (Greenberg et al., 1992; Jost & Napier, 2012) suggests a source may be 
more persuasive to conservative or liberal receivers depending on perceived similarity.  
Research demonstrates source similarity enhances persuasion. For example, Berscheid 
(1985) notes how attitudinal similarity increases receivers’ attraction to message senders. 
Similarly, Mackie, Worth, and Ansuncion (1990) found participants were more willing to 
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process persuasive messages attributed to an ingroup source, but less willing to process messages 
attributed to an outgroup source. Briñol and Petty (2009) explained these processing effects by 
noting how shared social identity serves as a cue to enhance persuasion under low (i.e., serves as 
periphery cue), moderate (i.e., increases processing), and high (i.e., biases perceptions) 
elaboration conditions. Indeed, identity similarity between source and receiver has been found to 
increase message-processing motivation across a range of contexts (Felming & Petty, 2000).   
In terms of ideology, Hogg’s (2007) UIT model holds that under conditions of self-
uncertainty, individuals are motivated to identify with extreme groups, given that their high 
entitativity helps to provide a sense of certainty and stability. Implicit in this argument is the 
notion that under conditions of self-uncertainty, people are attracted to extreme groups regardless 
of (or in spite of) ideological dissimilarity. For the most part, UIT places greater emphasis on the 
perceived rigidity of a group’s structure relative to congruence with a group’s perceived 
ideological similarity. Within reason, any ideological group could conceivably provide self-
certainty, as long as the group is sufficiently structured so as to provide the requisite prototypes 
into which members can self-categorize, and thereby stabilize their identities. However, unlike 
UTM and TMT, research utilizing UIT has thus far not examined political ideology as a 
predictor. Therefore, the following research question is proposed:  
RQ1: Do group extremism, self-uncertainty, and ideological congruence interact to affect 
(a) identification, (b) behavioral intentions, (c) source credibility, (d) attitude toward 
the advocated behavior, and (e) message quality?      
The final dependent measure to be examined in this experiment involves formulating 
counterarguments in favor of an extreme group—against an issue the group opposes. 
Counterarguing is an important outcome variable in studies employing a range of persuasion 
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theories, including parallel process models such as the elaboration likelihood model (ELM; Petty 
& Cacioppo, 1986), and the heuristic-systematic model (HSM; Chaiken, Liberman, & Eagly), as 
well as inoculation (McGuire, 1961) and psychological reactance (Brehm, 1966) theories. 
Although research across theoretical domains conceives of the ability to actively generate 
counterarguments as indicative of resistance to persuasion (Compton & Pfau, 2005), the inverse 
may also be true: That is, successful attempts at persuasion might well enhance receivers’ ability 
to generate counterarguments on behalf of the message source. In this study, it is hypothesized 
that a group high in entitativity (i.e., the more extreme group) should be more persuasive when 
self-uncertainty is induced (H1, H2, and H3). It would therefore follow that self-uncertainty 
should motivate greater counterarguing in favor of the positions advocated by an extreme group 
(e.g., against a proposed tuition increase). However, to date, no study has tested the relationships 
between self-uncertainty, entitativity, and counterarguing. Thus, the following hypotheses are 
proposed: 
H5: There is a main effect for perceived group extremism such that, relative to exposure to 
an extreme group, exposure to a moderate group increases counterarguing.  
H6: There is a main effect for perceived self-uncertainty such that, relative to self-
certainty, self-uncertainty increases counterarguing.  
H7: Self-uncertainty interacts with perceived group extremity such that in the extreme 
group condition, relative to self-certainty, self-uncertainty increases counterarguing, 
whereas in the moderate group condition, there is no difference between self-certainty 
and self-uncertainty on counterarguing  
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Chapter 4: Method 
Participants  
Undergraduates in the Communication Department research participant pool at the 
University of Oklahoma (N = 423; age: M = 20.00, SD = 2.53, range: 18-48; 61.2% female) 
received credit or extra credit in their Communication courses for participating in this study. 
Approximately 68% of participants identified as White, 4% as Black or African American, 7% as 
Asian or South Asian, 1% as Native-American or Pacific Islander, 3% as Latino or Hispanic, 2% 
as Middle-Eastern, 12% as mixed race/ethnicity, and 1% did not provide race/ethnicity. Since the 
study involved deception about a tuition increase (described below), participants were given the 
option to withdraw their data after being debriefed if they chose to, and one participant so 
choosing was excluded from analyses.  
Based on previous research (Hohman et al., 2017; Massey et al., 2017; Rast, Hogg, & 
Giessner, 2016), the following effect size was predicted, ηρ
2 = .02. Power analysis showed 
multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA) with three predictors and six response variables 
requires 341 participants to detect an effect of ηρ
2 = .02 with 80% power at the .05 alpha level. 
Thus, the sample collected met power requirements for MANOVA.    
Design 
The study employed a 2 (self-uncertainty: self-certainty vs. self-uncertainty) × 2 (group 
extremism: high entitativity vs. low entitativity) × 2 (ideological congruence: congruent vs. non-
congruent) independent group design. Participants completed an online pretest measuring 
political ideology before attending a lab session. In the lab, participants read about an ostensible 
tuition increase, and then were randomly assigned to watch an interview of two moderate or 
extreme student group leaders responding to news of the increase, after which participants were 
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primed with self-certainty or uncertainty. The ideology of the group was manipulated by 
describing the groups as conservative or liberal. Ideology scores from the pre-test were used to 
create an ideological congruency grouping variable. Dependent variables included identification 
with the group, behavioral intentions towards the group, perceptions of source credibility (i.e. 
competence, trustworthiness, and perceived goodwill), attitudes towards the group’s positions, 
perceptions of the group’s message quality, and evaluations of self-uncertainty, as well as 
counterarguments against pro-tuition increase arguments.  
Procedure and Materials 
Pretest. Participants were recruited online through the research participation pool in the 
Department of Communication. Once participants scheduled a lab appointment, they received an 
email containing a link to the online pretest. Any participants who did not complete the pretest 
within 48 hours of their lab appointment were contacted to re-schedule the in-lab session. After 
providing consent for the online pretest, participants were presented two measures of ideology 
(described below), after which they completed demographics and were given a short debrief 
wherein they were given information about the local institutional review board and contact 
information for the principal investigator. 
In-lab experiment. Participants came to a lab on campus and were seated at a computer 
whereupon they received a short introduction from the research assistant, after which they were 
presented with an online survey hosted on the Qualtrics survey website containing all the study 
materials described below. Participants were first presented with a consent form, and upon 
consenting to participate, read the following script from Massey et al. (2017) describing a tuition 
increase being considered by the OU Board of Regents: 
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The Higher Education Contribution Plan 
We’d like to familiarize you with the nature of the proposed increase 
in Mandatory Enrollment Fees known as the Higher Education Contribution Plan, 
or HECP, which is designed to maintain and improve the quality of education at 
OU. This controversial plan includes proposed increases in the following student fees to 
be paid in addition to standard credit hour based tuition fees: 
Student Activity & Facility Fees to supports student services, counseling and 
testing facilities, and transportation services. 
Technology and Connectivity Fees to maintain computing labs and classroom 
technology, and IT support and network services. 
Academic Excellence Fees to help recruit and retain excellent faculty and their 
research laboratories, equipment, and assistants. 
Life Safety Fees for classroom maintenance and resident hall improvements 
ensuring fire safety and personal wellbeing. 
Security Services Fees to improve campus lighting, emergency phones, police 
and security services. 
Other Mandatory Enrollment Fees to fund operation, maintenance and 
development of the University infrastructure, including Special Event and Speaker 
Fees and Student Assessment Fees. 
 In addition to their tuition fees, the controversial mandatory student fees required 
by the HECP are expected to add a 20-25% cost increase in student education charges 
for each year of enrollment at OU. 
Consequently, this cost increase is expected to lead to a substantial escalation in 
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student borrowing, and an associated surge in subsequent college debt upon graduation. 
Source manipulation: Extreme versus moderate groups. After reading about the 
tuition increase, participants were randomly assigned to view materials from one of two OU 
student groups that ostensibly were: “formed in response to the HECP.” Identical wording was 
used to describe the two groups with the exception of ideological orientation. In explaining the 
group’s ideological position (liberal vs. conservative), the liberal group was described as 
espousing “values of moral care, fairness, and reciprocity,” whereas the conservative group was 
described as “valuing respect for authority, in-group loyalty, purity, and sanctity.” Haidt and 
Joseph (2004, 2007) have outlined such values as comprising the moral foundation for liberals 
and conservatives, respectively. Their instructions were as follows: 
Students Against Tuition Inequality (SATI) 
Following is an interview of the [conservative or liberal] OU student group 
that formed in response to the Higher Education Contribution Plan. The group is 
comprised of current OU students and goes by the name Students Against Tuition 
Inequality, or SATI for short.   
Next, you will watch a 4-minute interview of the leaders of SATI by the OU 
College of Journalism weekly student-led news report, Speaking OUt.   
When you are finished watching the clip, you will be shown interviews with other OU 
students so that you can form a complete impression.  
Please pay close attention to the video clip and try to note the policy stances 
advocated by the leaders of Students Against Tuition Inequality, a [conservative or 
liberal] student action group committed to [conservative or liberal ideals]. 
 Upon reading about the SATI, participants watched a four-minute clip of the group’s 
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leaders being interviewed on a campus news show called Speaking OUt, ostensibly produced by 
OU undergraduates. The interviews were carefully scripted and recorded with performers from 
the OU College of Journalism and Mass Communication. The scripts were designed to reflect 
two types of groups—either moderate (low entitativity) or extreme (high entitativity). The actors 
were broadcast majors who regularly produced an actual, award-winning newscast for the 
university. The actors performed the same role of group leaders in both the moderate and 
extreme conditions, and the same actress played the interviewer in both interviews.  
The scripts for the video manipulation were based on Hogg et al. (2010), and were used 
in Massey et al. (2017). Within each video, the host of Speaking OUt asked the leaders to 
describe the structure of the group as well as the group’s response to the HECP. The leaders of 
the extreme group describe a disciplined, tightly knit, hierarchical group, with little disagreement 
allowed, and a shared vision required for membership. The extreme leaders also presented a 
militant pose in response to the HECP, advocating for rallies and marches, as well as class 
walkouts, sit-ins, and campus blockades.  
In contrast, the moderate leaders described a loosely organized group, which was easy to 
join, open to dialogue, and welcoming of dissenting opinions. The moderate group advocated a 
measured approach to the HECP, encouraging members to engage in open dialogue and 
discussion—both within the group and with administration officials. Whereas the extreme group 
called for protests and confrontation with the administration, the moderates proposed meetings, 
leaflets and letter-writing campaigns.   
When asked what they intend to do in response to the HECP proposal, the leader of the 
extreme group responded:  
We’ll blockade the campus if we have to. We’re going to make sure they understand OU 
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students can't be pushed around. There’s no way the administration can take away our 
right to a good—and affordable—education. We’ll do whatever it takes to ensure all of 
us—from the richest to the poorest—have the opportunity we deserve. 
The leader of the moderate group responded with a less extreme approach, for example:  
We’re committed to change through dialogue. We’ll be writing letters to the Daily. We’ll 
be distributing leaflets flyers on cars and hanging posters in the Union. Another thing 
we’re planning is to hold public discussions and meetings and engage in a dialogue to 
inform students about all the issues surrounding the HECP. 
After random assignment to moderate or extreme group video conditions, participants 
completed Hogg et al.’s (2010) manipulation check measure, which assessed group entitativity 
(presented below). 
Manipulating self-uncertainty. After the entitativity check, participants were randomly 
assigned to either a self-certainty or self-uncertainty condition. The induction involved two steps: 
first, reading a short “student-on-the-street” op-ed ostensibly written by a student responding to 
the HECP, and second, writing an essay about feeling certain or uncertain. The “student-on-the-
street” prime consisted of an op-ed written by a fellow student presented as a part of the student 
paper (i.e., the OU Daily). Hogg et al. (2010) and Massey et al. (2017) successfully used a 
similar priming technique to make participants aware other students on campus were certain or 
uncertain about the HECP.  
The op-ed articles were carefully edited to make them appear as screenshots from the OU 
Daily. For the certainty prime, the op-ed author expressed relative calm about the increase; for 
example, mentioning:  
I’m feeling pretty certain about the future when it comes to tuition. Why? Because big 
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initiatives like this take years to pass. I’ll be long gone before anything happens. I feel 
certain I won’t have to drop out anytime soon. Most people I know have enough money 
for video games and beer, so I think they’ll be all right too.  
The author of the uncertainty op-ed expressed worry at the prospect of the HECP passing: 
I’m feeling uncertain about the future when it comes to tuition. I cannot afford a fraction 
of what my degree costs as it is. I bought a $120 textbook this semester and I’ll probably 
get 10 bucks back…if anything. I pay $250 for a parking permit, and I can’t find a spot. I 
have 3 roommates and I pay $300 in rent. Now higher tuition? I can’t handle more debt. 
I might have to drop out if the HECP passes. 
After reading the op-ed, participants were prompted to complete the certainty/uncertainty 
induction (Hogg et al., 2010; Massey et al., 2017) asking them to first think about the HECP, and 
then complete a writing task using the following instructions:  
Please take a few minutes and think about various aspects in your life that make you feel 
the most [certain/uncertain] about yourself, your future, or your place in the world; then 
write a few brief sentences about three of these aspects related to your [certainty/ 
uncertainty] below.  
After the writing task, participants rated their identification with SATI, behavioral 
intentions to act on behalf of SATI, source credibility of the SATI leaders, attitude towards the 
SATI’s message, message quality of the group, and were presented with the self-
certainty/uncertainty manipulation check. Additionally, participants were presented with three 
pro-HECP prompts (described in the instrumentation section), then asked whether they agreed or 
disagreed, before being given a chance to provide counter-arguments against the prompts. As a 
methodological note, in Hogg et al. (2010), participants received the self-uncertainty 
  42 
manipulation check at the end of the survey. Since Massey et al. (2017) was a replication, the 
same procedure was used. The manipulation check (1 = not very uncertain, 9 = very uncertain) 
in Hogg et al. (2010) (self-uncertainty: M = 5.59, vs. self-certainty: M = 4.45, F[1, 78] = 7.09, p 
< .01) and Massey et al. (2017) (self-uncertainty: M = 4.91, vs. self-certainty: M = 4.31, t [182] = 
-1.96; p < .05)  revealed those in the self-uncertain conditions were significantly more uncertain 
than the self-certain conditions. A similar check was used at the end of the survey in this research 
(see Hohman & Hogg, 2015; Hohman et al., 2017, below). When completed, participants were 
debriefed face-to-face about the deception used, and given the chance to withdraw their data.  
Instrumentation 
Magnitude ratio-type scales were used to measure all dependent variables. The scales 
range from zero to an unbounded upper end, avoiding possible ceiling effects (Lodge, 1981). At 
the beginning of each lab session, participants received verbal instructions on how to use 
magnitude scales. To measure message quality, for example, participants were asked to indicate 
how much they agreed with a series of statements (e.g., “How persuasive was the message?”) 
using a scale ranging from zero to infinity, where zero represents zero amount of an attribute 
being measured (e.g., “the message was not persuasive at all”) and 100 indicates a moderate 
amount of an attribute (e.g., “the message was moderately persuasive”). Using 100 (i.e., 
moderate amount) as a yardstick, participants can indicate their own internal perceptions relative 
to the yardstick. A score of 500, for instance, would indicate five times the moderate level; 1,000 
would be 10 times moderate, and so on (see appendix A).          
Raw data were screened prior to analyses, and no systematically missing data were 
found. Next, the distribution of each variable was assessed. Since magnitude scales are 
unbounded at the top, variables measured using magnitude scales tend to be positively skewed, 
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and can result in extreme outlying cases (Bessarabova, Fink, & Turner, 2013). Thus, data were 
examined for the presence of outliers as well as violations of normality assumptions (requiring 
that residuals of the dependent variables are normally distributed) necessary for analyses using 
the general linear model (Bauer & Fink, 1983; Fink, 2009).  
To control for outliers, each dependent variable was winsorized by recoding extreme 
values to a lower score that corresponds with the “nearest value of an observation not seriously 
suspect” (Tukey, 1962, p. 18). This procedure moves extreme values closer to the center of the 
distribution instead of trimming them out (meaning data is recoded and not deleted). To 
complete this procedure, any variable with skewness greater than 1.0 was examined, and outliers 
above the 95th percentile were recoded into a value corresponding to 95th percentile of each 
variable distribution (Dixon & Yuen, 1974).  
After winsorizing outliers, any scale item with skewness or kurtosis greater than 1.0 was 
then transformed to improve normality and equality of variance using the following equation, 
Y*= (Y + k)λ, where Y is the original variable, Y* is the transformed variable, and k is a constant, 
and such that when λ = 0, Y*= ln(Y + k), and λ ≠ 0, then  Y*= (Y + k)λ (Fink, 2009). Since 
magnitude scales have zero at the origin and are unbounded at the top, all items had skewness 
and kurtosis scores greater than 1.0 across all items, indicating the need for data transformation 
(see Osborne, 2013). Where transformations were required, the same transformation was 
performed on all items of an index. A summary of transformations can be found in Tables 1-7. 
Once the data were transformed, indexes were formed using principal components 
analysis (PCA) in SPSS 23.0. This process includes saving un-rotated components with 
eigenvalues greater than 1.0 as regression weights. Such a procedure (Afifi, Clark, & May, 2004; 
DiStefano, Zhu, & Mîndrilă, 2009; for application examples, see Bessarabova et al., 2013; 
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Cionea, Van Gilder, Hoelscher, & Anagondahalli, 2018) weights each scale item in proportion to 
the item’s contribution to the principal component. Resulting indexes have a mean of 0.00, a 
standard deviation of 1.00, and range from -3 to +3. PCA reliabilities (i.e., PCreliability) were 
calculated using the following equation, N/(N-1) × (E-1)/E, where N = number of items and E = 
eigenvalues for principal components (see Hampson, Goldberg, & John, 1987). 
Overall, for each scale used, all items loaded on a single component with an eigenvalue 
greater than 1.00, with only one item showing λi< .50 (Brown, 2015; Costello & Osborne, 2005; 
see Tables 7). All scales showed high internal consistency (i.e., PCreliability = .89 or above). Because 
the transformed data met the assumptions of normality, items showed strong loadings, all items 
loaded on a single component, and each scale was found to be reliable, the dependent variables 
were deemed appropriate for hypothesis testing. Correlations and reliability coefficients are 
presented in Table 9 and a complete list of measures is presented in Appendix B.  
Pretest Measures 
Political ideology. Ideology was measured with the standard American National Election 
Studies (ANES) single item scale ranging from 0 (extremely liberal) to 100 (extremely 
conservative). Ideology was also captured using an ANES three-item scale taking the average of 
self-placement scores from 0 = very liberal to 100 = very conservative on “social issues,” “issues 
of taxes and spending,” and “foreign policy issues.”  The single-item measure (M = 51.45, SD = 
25.56) and the composite measure (M = 53.99, SD = 24.43) were not significantly different (p > 
0.1). Thus, the composite measure was used to match congruence between participant ideology 
in the pretest with group ideology. To match on congruence, a median split was used, with those 
on the liberal end of the measure coded as liberal and those on the conservative end as 
conservative. Based on manipulation of group type, participants were exposed to either a group 
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sharing their ideology (congruent) or one not sharing their ideology (incongruent), and the 
congruency group variable was used to test H4 and RQ1 (full details in Results section below).  
In-lab Measures 
Manipulation check of group extremism. As a check on group extremity, entitativity 
was measured using Hogg et al.’s (2010) scale, asking participants to evaluate the student group 
(SATI) on the following dimensions: hierarchical structure, cohesion, clearly defined structure, 
organization, homogeneity, clarity of message, distinctiveness, intolerance of dissent, strong 
leadership, and intent on forceful action. Participants were given a short definition of each 
dimension (e.g., “If a group of people is considered to be homogeneous, then they might be 
thought of as all being relatively the same or similar”) and then asked to evaluate SATI on that 
dimension. Because groups high in entitativity are perceived to be extreme in nature (e.g., tightly 
organized, hierarchically structured, dismissive of dissent), the higher the entitativity scores, the 
more extreme participants are assumed to perceive the group.  
Group identification. Identification with SATI was measured using Hogg et al.’s (2010) 
nine-item scale adapted by Massey et al. (2017). Participants were asked to indicate their 
agreement with statements describing identification with SATI, using magnitude scales. Example 
items included, “How much do you feel you’d like to get to know the members of the group 
Students Against Tuition Inequality?” “Based on what you know from the video, how much do 
you feel you might like to join the group Students Against Tuition Inequality?” and, “How likely 
would you be to stand up for the group Students Against Tuition Inequality?” 
Behavioral intentions. Intentions to act on behalf of SATI were measured using Hogg et 
al.’s (2010) 10-item scale. Measured on a magnitude scale, items asked participants how likely 
they would be to: “Petition the university on behalf of SATI;” “Participate in demonstrations on 
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behalf of SATI;” or “Engage in a sit-in on behalf of SATI.”   
 Source credibility. To determine perceptions of source credibility, McCroskey and 
Teven’s (1999) 18-item scale was used. The original scale consists of three dimensions: 
competence, goodwill, and trustworthiness. To adapt the differential to a magnitude scale, 
participants were asked to evaluate adjectives from the positive end of the scale. For competence, 
example items asked participants, “How intelligent is SATI?” “How trained is SATI?” and “How 
expert is SATI?” For goodwill, participants were asked to indicate how much they agreed with 
statements such as, “SATI is charitable;” “SATI cares about me;” and “SATI has my interests at 
heart.” For trustworthiness, participants responded to items such as, “SATI is honest;” “SATI is 
trustworthy;” and “SATI is honorable.”    
Attitudes. To measure participants’ attitudes towards the positions advocated by SATI, 
an adapted version of Dillard and Shen’s (2005) seven-item scale (good, wise, 
favorable, positive, desirable, necessary, and beneficial) was used. Participants were prompted to 
think about the positions taken by SATI in the interview, and respond to items measured on a 
magnitude scale, such as, “How good were the positions advocated in the video?” 
“How favorable were the positions advocated in the video?” and “How acceptable were the 
positions advocated in the video?” 
 Message quality. Message quality was assessed using Updegraff et al.’s (2007) seven-
item scale. Participants were prompted to think about the quality of the messages proposed by 
SATI in the interview and assess it using a magnitude scale. Example items include, 
“How persuasive was the message?” “How clear was the message?” and “How accurate was the 
message?”    
Self-uncertainty. Hohman and Hogg’s (2015) 10-item self-uncertainty scale was used as 
  47 
a manipulation check. Participants were asked to rate how much they agreed with questions 
according to their beliefs and experiences. Example items include: “My beliefs about myself often 
conflict with one another;” “One day I might have one opinion of myself and on another day I 
might have a different opinion;” and “I wonder about what kind of person I really am.”  
Qualitative Counterargument Data 
 Counterarguments. To capture the number of counterarguments generated against the 
HECP, an active counterarguing measure was used (Banas & Bessarabova, 2009). Participants 
responded to the following three prompts: (1) the HECP will improve the quality of education at 
the University of Oklahoma; (2) the HECP will positively influence students at the University of 
Oklahoma; and (3) no students at the University of Oklahoma will be forced to drop out if the 
HECP passes. Participants were then asked to indicate if they accepted or rejected the prompt, 
and then to provide reasons why.  
Coders analyzed responses to calculate number of counterarguments produced. To do so, 
the author trained two coders how to identify counterarguments using a random sample of 
responses (20% of thoughts). Coders were given a definition for the term counterargument (e.g., 
to speak or act in opposition to a reason or set of reasons given with the aim of persuading 
others that an action or idea is right or wrong) and instructed to score participant responses such 
that each counterargument was scored as 1, and everything else (including agreement) as 0 (see 
Appendix C). Initial scores were analyzed using Krippendorff’s alpha. Results showed good 
intercoder reliability for number of counterarguments between coder 1 and 2 (𝛼 = 0.87; Hayes & 
Krippendorff, 2007). Based on this approach, the remainder of responses was coded separately. 
When coding was complete, the author met with the coders to check scores. All disagreements 
were resolved verbally with the final result being total agreement on number of 
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counterarguments produced for each participant. Number of counterarguments from prompts 1, 
2, and 3 ranged from 0 (no counterarguments present) to 4 (four counterarguments present). 
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Chapter 5: Results 
Multivariate Results 
MANOVA was used to analyze results, with group extremism (moderate vs. extreme), 
self-uncertainty (certain vs. uncertain), and group ideology (conservative vs. liberal) entered as 
the independent variables, and entitativity, identification, behavioral intentions, source credibility 
(i.e., competence, goodwill, and trustworthiness as separate dependent variables), attitudes (i.e., 
towards SATI’s position on the HECP), and message quality as the dependent variables. As 
noted previously, the first un-rotated principal component saved as a regression weight for each 
scale was used to create indexes for dependent variables. The resulting scales have a mean of 
0.00, a standard deviation of 1.00, with scores ranging from -3 to +3. All means and standard 
deviations reported in results are based on these metrics.  
Multivariate results revealed main effects for self-uncertainty, Wilks’ Λ = .94, F(9, 396) 
= 2.61, p < .01, ηp2 = .06, and group extremism, Wilks’ Λ = .48, F(9, 396) = 47.57, p < .001, ηp2 
= .52, whereas group ideology failed to reach significance, Wilks’ Λ = .98, F(9, 396) = 0.84, p = 
.58.   
The two-way interactions for Self-uncertainty × Group Extremism, Wilks’ Λ = .97, F(9, 
396) = 1.41, p = .18, Self-uncertainty × Group Ideology, Wilks’ Λ = .99, F(9, 396) = 0.53, p = 
.86, and Group Extremism × Group Ideology, Wilks’ Λ = .98, F(9, 396) = 0.78, p = .64, were all 
non-significant. However, the three-way Self-uncertainty × Group Extremism × Group Ideology 
interaction was significant, Wilks’ Λ = .95, F(8, 397) = 2.80, p < .01, ηp2 = .06, indicating the 
interaction had a significant effect on at least one of the dependent variables.  
Manipulation Checks 
Univariate results showed exposure to the extreme group (M = 0.64, SD = 0.84) 
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significantly increased perceptions of entitativity, F(1, 404) = 264.51, p < .001, ηp2 = .40, 
compared to the moderate group (M = -0.61, SD = 0.73), indicating the manipulation of the 
student groups—one high entitativity (i.e., extreme) and one low (i.e., moderate)—was 
successful. For self-uncertainty, scores were significantly higher in the self-uncertainty condition 
(M = 0.13, SD = 1.07) compared to the certainty condition, (M = -0.13, SD = .90), F(1, 404) = 
7.53, p < .01, ηp2 = .02. Based on these results, the self-uncertainty induction was also successful. 
Hypotheses Tests: H1 through H3 
Main effect of group extremism. H1 predicted a main effect for perceived group 
extremism such that, relative to those exposed to an extreme group, those exposed to a moderate 
group would report greater (a) identification, (b) behavioral intentions to act on behalf of the 
group, (c) perceptions of source credibility, (d) positive attitudes toward the advocated position, 
and (e) favorable perceptions of message quality. As compared to the extreme group (M = -0.10, 
SD = 1.05), participants exposed to the moderate group (M = 0.11, SD = 0.93) expressed greater 
identification with SATI, F(1, 404) = 3.83, p = .05, ηp2 = .01, although there was no significant 
difference between groups on behavioral intentions, F(1, 404) = 0.34, p =.56 . Thus, H1a was 
supported, however H1b was not.   
Contrary to expectations, of the three dimensions of source credibility, exposure to the 
extreme group (M = 0.18, SD = 1.04) significantly increased rather than decreased perceptions of 
source competence, F(1, 404) = 13.38, p < .001, ηp2 = .03, compared to the moderate group (M = 
-0.16, SD = 0.94). However, as hypothesized, the extreme group (M = -0.18, SD = 1.05) was 
characterized by significantly lower goodwill, F(1, 404) = 15.14, p < .05, ηp2 = .04, compared to 
the moderate group (M = 0.19, SD = 0.92). There was no significant difference between groups 
on trustworthiness of SATI, F(1, 404) = 1.39, p = .24. Thus, H1c was only partially supported.  
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The difference between extreme and moderate groups on attitudes towards SATI’s 
positions was not significant, F(1, 404) = 2.10, p = .15. Contrary to H1e, exposure to the extreme 
group (M = 0.11, SD = 0.93) significantly increased perceptions of message quality F(1, 404) = 
15.65, p < .001, ηp2 = .04, compared to the moderate group (M = 0.18, SD = 1.02). Thus, H1d 
and H1e were not supported.  
Main effect self-uncertainty. H2 predicted a main effect for perceived self-uncertainty 
such that, relative to those in the self-certainty condition, those in the self-uncertainty condition 
would report greater (a) group identification, (b) behavioral intentions to act on behalf of the 
group, (c) perceptions of source credibility, (d) positive attitudes toward the advocated position, 
and (e) favorable perceptions of message quality. Univariate results found self-uncertainty (M = 
0.17, SD = 1.02) increased identification, F(1, 404) = 11.40, p < .001, ηp2 = .03, compared to 
self-certainty (M = -0.17, SD = 0.94). Behavioral intention to act on behalf of the group was also 
significantly higher in the self-uncertainty condition (M = 0.16, SD = 1.11), F(1, 404) = 12.77, p 
< .001, ηp2 = .03, compared to self-certainty (M = -0.83, SD = 0.93). Thus, H2a and H2b were 
fully supported.   
For the measure of source credibility, self-uncertainty (M = 0.14, SD = 1.11) significantly 
increased perceptions of competence, F(1, 404) = 9.55, p < .01, ηp2 = .02, compared to self-
certainty (M = -0.13, SD = 1.01); increased goodwill towards SATI F(1, 404) = 5.77, p < .05, ηp2 
= .02 (self-uncertainty: M = 0.14, SD = 0.97, vs. self-certainty: M = -0.13, SD = 1.02); and 
increased perceptions of trustworthiness, F(1, 404) = 5.71, p < .05, ηp2 = .01, (self-uncertainty: M 
= 0.12, SD = 1.01, vs. self-certainty, M = -0.13, SD = 0.99). Thus, H2c was also fully supported.  
Regarding attitudes, self-uncertainty increased positive attitudes towards SATI’s 
positions on the HECP (M = 0.15, SD = 0.98), F(1, 404) = 9.63, p < .001, ηp2 = .02, compared to 
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self-certainty (M = -0.16, SD = 1.00). Those in the self-uncertain condition also rated SATI’s 
message quality higher (M = 0.17, SD = 1.01), F(1, 404) = 14.08, p < .001, ηp2 = .04, compared 
to the self-certainty condition (M = -0.17, SD = 0.97). Thus, H2d and H2e were also supported.  
 Self-uncertainty × Group Extremism interaction. H3 predicted that, whereas there 
should be no difference between self-certainty and self-uncertainty within the moderate 
condition, self-uncertainty should interact with perceived group extremity within the extreme 
group condition, such that relative to those in the self-certainty condition, those in the self-
uncertainty condition should report greater (a) identification, (b) behavioral intentions to act on 
behalf of the group, (c) perceptions of source credibility, (d) positive attitudes toward the 
advocated position, and (e) favorable perceptions of message quality. As noted, multivariate 
results did not support an interaction between self-uncertainty and group extremism. However, 
univariate results found the Self-uncertainty × Group Extremism interaction on goodwill 
approached significance, F(1, 404) = 3.44, p = .06, ηp2 = .01, and had a statistically significant 
effect on attitudes, F(1, 404) = 4.47, p = .032, ηp2 = .01. Thus, although multivariate results were 
non-significant for the Self-uncertainty × Group Extremism interaction, the shape of the 
interaction at the univariate level was consistent with H3c and H3d. Therefore, the simple effect 
of each outcome variable was examined using separate t tests. 
As predicted, goodwill scores were significantly different between self-certainty (M = -
0.38, SD = 1.03) and self-uncertainty (M = 0.03, SD = 1.02) within the extreme condition, t(204) 
= -2.87, p < .01, d = -0.40 (see Figure 1), and this was not the case in the moderate condition, 
t(210) = -0.49, p = .63. Similarly, within the extreme condition, attitudes towards SATI’s 
message were significantly more positive in the self-uncertainty condition (M = 0.19, SD = 1.06) 
than in the self-certainty condition (M = -0.30, SD = 1.07), t(205) = -3.32, p < .001, d = -.46 (see 
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Figure 2), and again, this was not the case in the moderate condition, t(211) = -0.80, p = .42. 
Thus, H3c was partially supported (i.e., goodwill), and H3d was fully supported.  
Self-uncertainty × Group Extremism × Group Ideology interaction. The Self-
uncertainty × Group Extremism interaction was qualified by a significant three-way interaction 
of Self-uncertainty × Group Extremism × Group Ideology. Similar to the two-way interaction, 
univariate results showed the three-way interaction was significant for goodwill, F(8, 404) = 
10.42, p < .001, ηp2 = .03, and attitudes, F(1, 404) = 5.41, p < .05, ηp2 = .01.  
The interaction was broken down for interpretation, revealing self-uncertainty increases 
perceptions of goodwill when comparing self-certainty (M = -0.002, SD = 0.99) and self-
uncertainty (M = 0.35 SD = 0.94) within the moderate, conservative condition, t(103) = -1.85, p 
= .07. There was not a significant difference on goodwill between self-certainty (M = -0.23, SD = 
1.01) and self-uncertainty (M = -0.13, SD = 0.90) in the extreme conservative group condition, 
t(100) = -0.52, p = .61. There was also no significant difference for goodwill scores within the 
moderate-liberal condition, when comparing self-certainty (M = 0.33, SD = 0.81) and self-
uncertainty (M = 0.10, SD = 0.90), t(105) = 1.40, p = .18. However, self-uncertainty increased 
perceptions of goodwill when comparing self-certainty (M = -0.60, SD = 1.04) and self-
uncertainty (M = 0.16, SD = 1.11) in the extreme-liberal group condition, t(102) = -3.40, p < 
.001, and the effect size was large, d = -0.71. 
There were no differences for attitude scores between self-certainty and self-uncertainty 
within the conservative group condition, for either a moderate (self-certainty: M = -0.08, SD = 
1.03; self-uncertainty M = 0.22, SD = 1.00), t(104) = -1.50, p = .14, or extreme group (self-
certainty: M = -0.16, SD = 1.15; self-uncertainty M = 0.06, SD = 1.00), t(101) = -1.00, p = .32. 
There was also no significant difference for attitude scores within the moderate-liberal condition, 
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comparing self-certainty (M = 0.13, SD = 0.72) to self-uncertainty (M = 0.03, SD = 0.81), t(105) 
= 0.65, p = .52. However, scores for goodwill were significantly different between self-certainty 
(M = -0.45, SD = 0.95) and self-uncertainty (M = 0.31, SD = 1.10) when exposed to the extreme 
liberal group, t(102) = -3.78, p < .001, and the effect size was, again, large d = -0.74. The overall 
shape of the interaction indicates participants showed higher goodwill and attitudes towards an 
extreme liberal group, but only when primed with self-uncertainty, consistent with Greenberg 
and Jonas (2003), and not Jost & Napier (2012). This effect was absent for the moderate, liberal 
group, and moderate and extreme conservative groups (see Figures 3 and 4). 
Hypothesis Test: H4 
To test H4 addressing ideological congruence between participants and SATI, a split file 
method was used, wherein the data were separated into sub-samples based on whether or not 
participants were exposed to a version of SATI corresponding to their political ideology, as 
measured in the pretest, where they were asked to rate themselves from 0 (totally liberal) to 100 
(totally conservative) on social issues, taxation, and foreign policy, and the three scores were 
averaged to create a composite ideology score. Median split (Mdn = 51) was used to assign 
ideology to participants (0 through 51 = liberal; 52 through 100 = conservative). During the in-
lab session, the description of SATI was manipulated so that participants were randomly exposed 
to a group portrayed as holding conservative or liberal values. A grouping variable was created 
based on whether participants were exposed to an ideologically congruent group (0 = non-
congruent, or 1 = congruent). The non-congruent/congruent variable was then used to split the 
data file, and a regression analysis was conducted to determine if participants’ ideology scores (0 
to 100) predicted scores on the outcome variables relevant to H4.  
H4 proposed that ideology predicted (a) greater identification, (b) behavioral intentions to 
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act on behalf of the group, (c) positive perceptions of source credibility, (d) positive attitudes 
toward the advocated position, and (e) favorable perceptions of message quality with an 
ideologically congruent group. H4a was not supported, as exposure to a congruent group was not 
associated with identification, F(1, 197) = 2.84, p = .10. H4b, however, was supported, as the 
regression model was significant, F(1, 200) = 23.86, p < .001, R2 = .11, R2adj = .10, with ideology 
significantly predicting behavioral intentions (β = -.33, p < .001). As scores for ideology became 
more liberal, intentions to act on behalf of the congruent group increased. Conversely, as 
ideology scores became more conservative, intention to act on behalf of the congruent group 
decreased.  
 H4 also predicted more favorable perceptions of (c) source credibility, (d) attitudes 
towards SATI’s positions, and (e) message quality for an ideologically congruent group. 
However, concerning source credibility, ideology did not predict competence, F(1, 200) = 0.60, 
p = .44, goodwill, F(1, 198) = 0.49, p = .49, or trust, F(1, 198) = 0.17, p = .68, when the source 
shared participants’ ideology. Furthermore, ideology was not associated with attitudes towards 
the group, F(1, 198) = 1.15, p = .28, or the group’s message quality, F(1, 198) = 1.14, p = .24; 
thus, H4 (c, d and e) were not supported.1  
Research Question 1  
RQ1 asked whether group extremism interacted with self-uncertainty and ideological 
congruence to affect (a) identification, (b) behavioral intentions, (c) positive perceptions of 
source credibility, (d) more favorable attitudes toward the advocated behavior, and (e) message 
quality. To address this question, a MANOVA was conducted using group extremism, self-
                                                 
1Analyses were conducted using a trichotomized grouping variable where ideology was split into 1/9th parts, and the 
middle 1/9th was removed to get a clearer distinction between the conservative 4/9ths and the liberal 4/9ths. Results 
were the same as those using the dichotomized variable. Ideology negatively predicted behavioral intentions in the 
congruent group condition.   
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uncertainty, and ideological congruence as independent variables, and identification, behavioral 
intentions, source credibility, attitude, and perceived message quality as dependent variables. 
Results showed significant main effects for self-uncertainty, Wilks’ Λ = .94, F(7, 388) = 3.39, p 
< .01, ηp2 = .06, and group extremism, Wilks’ Λ = .49, F(7, 388) = 17.28, p < .001, ηp2 = .24, but 
not ideological congruence, Wilks’ Λ = 1.00, F(7, 388) = 0.19, p = .99.  
In examining the interactions, the Self-uncertainty × Group Extremism (Wilks’ Λ = .97, 
F[7, 388] = 1.62, p = .13) and Self-uncertainty × Congruent Ideology (Wilks’ Λ = .99, F[7, 388] 
= 0.51, p = .83) interactions were not significant. However, the Group Extremism × Congruent 
Ideology interaction was significant, indicating there were differences on some outcome 
variables comparing extreme versus moderate conditions, when participants shared ideology 
with the groups portrayed in the study, Wilks’ Λ = .96, F(7, 388) = 2.11, p < .05, ηp2 = .04. 
 Univariate results revealed the Group Extremism × Congruent Ideology interaction was 
significant for identification, F(1, 394) = 8.30, p < .01, ηp2 = .02, and behavioral intentions, F(1, 
394) = 5.72, p < .05, ηp2 = .01. For source credibility, the effects of the interaction on 
competence approached significance, F(1, 394) = 3.31, p = .07, ηp2 = .01, the effect on goodwill 
was not significant, F(1, 394) = 1.79, p = .18, and the effect on trustworthiness was significant, 
F(1, 394) = 5.47, p < .05, ηp2 = .01. Finally, the effect of the Group Extremism × Congruent 
Ideology interaction on attitudes was significant, F(1, 394) = 4.72, p < .05, ηp2 = .01, whereas, 
this interaction on message quality failed to reach significance, F(1, 394) = 1.17, p = .28.  These 
results indicate that overall, when ideology was congruent (i.e., participant shared group’s 
ideology), scores for identification, intentions, source goodwill and trustworthiness were all 
higher in the moderate versus the extreme group conditions.  
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Simple effect for group extremism within the congruent-ideology condition. 
Comparing the extreme and moderate groups within the congruent ideological condition reveals 
significant simple effects for identification, behavioral intentions, source trustworthiness, and 
attitudes. The trend across all results reveals participants producing higher scores in response to 
the moderate group relative to the extreme group, but only when the group was described as 
having an ideology congruent with the participants’. There were no significant differences 
between groups in the non-congruent condition. Means, standard deviations, t-test results along 
with effect sizes are provided in Table 10. 
Hypotheses Tests: H5 through H7 
To the author’s knowledge, no research has examined counterarguing in relation to self-
uncertainty and extreme groups. Thus, H5 through H7 followed the same logic as the first three 
hypotheses. Essentially, a main effect was predicted for group extremism such that, compared to 
an extreme group, exposure to a moderate group should increase counterarguments (H5). It was 
also predicted that there should be a main effect for self-uncertainty such that, compared to self-
certainty, self-uncertainty should increase counterarguments against the HECP (H6). Finally, it 
was predicted that self-uncertainty should interact with perceived group extremity such that in 
the extreme group condition, relative to self-certainty, self-uncertainty should increase 
counterarguing against the HECP, whereas there should be no difference in the moderate 
condition (H7).  
To measure counterarguments, participants read the following prompts: (1) The HECP 
will improve the quality of education at the University of Oklahoma; (2) The HECP will 
positively influence students at the University of Oklahoma; and (3) No students at the University 
of Oklahoma will be forced to drop out if the HECP passes. Participants were asked if they 
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agreed with each prompt, and then given a chance to provide their reasoning. Coders analyzed 
those responses counting the number of counterarguments present. Responses ranged from 0 (no 
counterarguments present) to 4 (four counterarguments present).   
A MANOVA was used with self-uncertainty and group extremism entered as the 
independent variables, and number of counterarguments for prompts 1, 2, and 3, entered as 
dependent variables. Multivariate results revealed a significant main effect for self-uncertainty, 
Wilks’ Λ = .92, F(3, 417) = 12.10, p < .01, ηp2 = .08, whereas group extremism, Wilks’ Λ = .98, 
F(3, 417) = 47.57, p = .76, and the Self-uncertainty × Group Extremism interaction, Wilks’ Λ = 
1.00, F(9, 396) = 0.17, p = .91, were  not significant. Thus, H5 and H7 were not supported.  
For self-uncertainty, univariate results showed no difference between self-certainty (M = 
0.46; SD = 0.58) and self-uncertainty (M = 0.54; SD = 0.66) for counterarguments on prompt 1, 
F(1, 419) = 1.83, p = .18. For prompt 2, individuals in the self-uncertainty condition (M = 0.84; 
SD = 0.63) produced significantly more counterarguments than those in the self-certainty 
condition (M = 0.63; SD = 0.57), F(1, 419) = 11.82, p > .01, ηp2 = .03. Similarly, for prompt 3, 
self-uncertainty (M = 1.07; SD = 0.74) produced more counterarguments than self-certainty (M = 
0.07; SD = 0.66), F(1, 419) = 30.39, p > .001, ηp2 = .07. These results show partial support for 
H6.   
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Chapter 6: Discussion 
Although extreme groups are thought to be a threat to democratic and civil societies, such 
groups are difficult to study. How would social scientists recruit jihadists or white supremacists 
to participate in campus research? To do so would be both foolish and dangerous. Accordingly, 
this dissertation adopted the novel approach of creating and experimentally designing extreme 
groups to test their appeal under conditions of self-uncertainty. The guiding theoretical 
framework, UIT, posits self-uncertainty motivates people to identify with groups to increase self-
certainty. Given how there is some debate within the literature as to whether liberals or 
conservatives are more prone to identify with extreme groups, this dissertation also considered 
ideological congruence between the group (source) and participant (receiver). Relationships 
between self-uncertainty, group extremism, group ideology, and ideological congruence were 
also considered.  
Results point to three general conclusions. First, key predictions of UIT were supported, 
with self-uncertainty showing a main effect across all outcomes. Second, self-uncertainty 
interacted with group extremism, resulting in more positive attitudes and goodwill directed at the 
extreme group. Third, ideological congruence between sender and receiver only affected 
behavioral intentions for liberals and not conservatives—a conclusion that does not provide 
support for Jost and Napier’s (2012) UTM, which holds that the need to reduce uncertainty is 
primarily associated with conservatism and not ideological extremism, in general. Finally, the 
unexpected main effect of group extremism on perceptions of source competence points to the 
need for greater scrutiny of issues relevant to source credibility outcomes associated with 
extreme groups in future research.  
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Overall, these findings contribute to theoretical literature related to self-uncertainty and 
extreme groups, as well as the role ideology plays in motivating people to support such groups. 
These results also contribute to risk and crisis communication by highlighting the need for new 
areas of persuasion research focused on the suasory appeal of such groups. In what follows, the 
theoretical and social implications of the findings reported in this dissertation are discussed, as 
well as limitations, future directions and concluding remarks.   
Support for UIT: Theoretical and Social Implications  
A primary postulation of UIT holds that self-uncertainty motivates people to identify with 
social groups. The present results support this proposition. Moreover, compared to self-certainty, 
those made to feel self-uncertain showed higher scores on all dependent variables, meaning they 
felt greater identification with SATI, considered the leaders to be more credible in terms of 
competence, goodwill, and trustworthiness, and rated their communication more favorably in 
terms of message quality, while producing more counterarguments against the HECP, in line 
with the group’s positions. Across the board, self-uncertainty motivated affiliation with SATI, 
regardless of group structure or ideology. This finding shows strong theoretical support for UIT, 
while stressing the important motivational role self-uncertainty plays for young adults.    
An important aspect of the present findings is related to the sample, which was comprised 
of emerging adults, a population noted for greater likelihood to experience uncertainty about 
social standing and autonomy (Arnett, 2004). These same populations fit the terrorism age-crime 
profile for suspects most likely to commit violent crimes, including acts of terrorism (Klausen, 
Morrill, & Libretti, 2016). Socio-demographic profiles of violent extremists show two-thirds of 
terrorists have at least some college education, and a small percentage (i.e., up to four percent) 
have advanced graduate degrees, including Ph.Ds. (Horgan, Gill, Bouhana, Silver, & Corner, 
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2016). This confluence of factors designates college-educated, emerging adult populations as 
particularly vulnerable to influence from extreme groups. Thus, understanding how self-
uncertainty motivates this population is a topic of immense social importance.   
Towards this end, UIT offers a framework for predicting affiliation with extreme groups. 
As UIT posits, groups with clear boundaries and strong leaders (i.e., high in entitativity) provide 
certainty to uncertain people (Hogg, 2007). Given groups high in entitativity tend to be extreme 
in orientation, a further implication of UIT is that self-uncertainty motivates identification with 
extreme groups (Hogg et al., 2010). Supporting this prediction, the Self-uncertainty × Group 
Extremism interaction showed a significant effect on perceived goodwill from the high entitative 
version of SATI and positive attitudes towards the group’s positions. These findings support 
UIT’s prediction about attraction to extreme groups and emphasize specific factors to consider 
for assessing risk susceptibility relevant to such groups.  
The high entitative, extreme version of SATI formed its arguments around three general 
points: (1) HECP is unfair; (2) SATI will resort to radical tactics to oppose the initiative; and (3) 
to effectively combat the HECP, SATI must be unyielding and intolerant. With this in mind, it is 
telling to note that only when made to feel self-uncertain did participants perceived more 
goodwill from this group. Recall, goodwill is a sub-dimension of source credibility related to 
character, with items such as, “SATI cares about me;” “SATI is concerned about me;” and “SATI 
has my interests at heart.” Under conditions of self-uncertainty, participants felt SATI was 
fighting for their interests, but only when the group projected an extreme orientation. Such a 
finding is noteworthy considering perceptions of goodwill were relatively more negative coming 
from the same group under self-certainty conditions (see Figure 1). Thus, self-uncertainty 
significantly improved perceptions of goodwill from the extreme group. 
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Attitudes mirrored goodwill. To measure attitudes, items asked how “good,” “wise,” and 
“positive” SATI’s positions were. When self-uncertain, participants rated the extreme group 
more favorably, even though some of their positions were quite aggressive (e.g., holding sit-ins, 
blockading campus, staging walkouts). As the Speaking OUt interview included discussion of 
SATI’s structure (e.g., “Our group has one mission and one mission only: Oppose and defeat the 
Higher Education Contribution Plan! Anyone who doesn’t share this one goal need not apply!”), 
attitude scores also suggest greater approval of a group presented as rigid, aggressive, and 
authoritarian.  
Although attitudes do not always predict behaviors, they do reflect mental evaluations of 
attitude objects, informing the range of behaviors deemed acceptable towards that object 
(McGuire, 1985). In describing the process of radicalization, Moghaddam (2005) argues the 
“first floor” of the “stairway to terrorism” involves evaluation of available options to fight unfair 
conditions (p. 163). If a person cannot improve unfair conditions, they may displace their 
aggression on a target associated with the injustice, moving from the first floor (evaluation) to 
the second (aggression). Results show self-uncertainty altered the range of actions deemed 
acceptable to fight the HECP, but only when advocated by an extreme group. Further, the 
retaliation advocated by the high entitative version of SATI intended to displace aggression 
across campus, not just towards administrators. Such a shift in attitudes may seem minor, as 
favoring extreme behavior is far from behaving extremely. Yet, if Moghaddam’s model is 
correct, radicalization begins with such small steps. Although linking current findings to 
Moghaddam’s model is beyond the scope of this dissertation, favorable attitudes towards radical 
action are noteworthy, especially when captured within a population actively recruited by 
extreme groups. 
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The Anti-Defamation League (ADL; 2019b) has recently released a report indicating 
white supremacist groups are targeting college campuses with recruitment propaganda. This 
observation underlines the stakes while providing a real-world application for the findings 
reported in this dissertation. An examination of correlations between variables in Table 9 shows 
a positive association between goodwill and attitudes towards the high entitative version of 
SATI’s positions (r = 0.69, p < .01). Yet, attitudes and goodwill capture different aspects of 
affiliation. Attitudes assessed the group’s advocacy, whereas goodwill measured perceptions of 
concern and support from the group. As participants perceived the more extreme group to be 
fighting on their behalf, their appraisal of the group’s advocacy became more favorable. 
Alternatively, as attitudes improved, so, too, did perceptions of goodwill. Regardless, as the 
ADL (2019b) has noted, white supremacist propaganda is aimed at establishing goodwill by 
claiming to defend against nefarious conspiratorial forces (e.g., Jewish media, one-world 
government, “cultural Marxism”). Although these imagined forces pose no real, physical threat 
to students, neither did the supposed HECP. Still, self-uncertain participants were motivated to 
perceive goodwill from the extreme version of the group. Source goodwill may be a key variable 
in understanding the critical opening sequence of recruitment efforts undertaken by extreme 
groups. If the ADL’s assessment is to be taken seriously, extreme groups are already working to 
leverage goodwill.    
The present findings also offer directions for counter-messaging campaigns. Inoculation 
theory (McGuire, 1961), for instance, might be utilized to develop interventions to “inoculate” 
students against the recruitment tactics of extreme groups. Successful inoculation requires an 
understanding of those tactics, a distillation of themes found across propaganda types. 
Inoculating potentially vulnerable populations against future perceptions of goodwill on the part 
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of extremist groups would offer one important avenue for study. In this regard, communication 
researchers are uniquely situated to undertake such an exploration. One of the discipline’s 
founding figures in the realm of political science, Harold Lasswell, conducted extensive analyses 
of propaganda in the 1920s and 1930s (see Rogers, 1994). Although global conditions may not 
be as dire now as in Lasswell’s time, there are striking similarities, given that right-wing 
authoritarianism is on the rise in eastern and central Europe (Europol, 2017), while left-wing 
anarchists are disrupting Greece and Italy (Souli, 2019). In the United States, so-called “alt-
right” neo-fascists battle militant so-called “Antifa” antifascist elements in metropolitan areas 
across the country, resulting in property damage, injury, and death (Stack, 2017). Furthermore, 
domestic terrorism in the United States seems to be taking a decidedly ideological turn, as 49 out 
of 50 domestic terrorism deaths in 2018 were perpetrated by individuals linked to right-wing 
extremist groups (ADL, 2019a; Serwer, 2019). In light of the growing threat of extreme groups, 
communication researchers are appropriately positioned to address this fast developing problem 
by returning to their disciplinary roots, and analyzing the high entitative aspects of the 
propaganda utilized by extreme groups, as Harold Lasswell did before World War II.    
Self-uncertainty, Group Extremism, and Group Ideology 
The results reported above also reveal an unexpected Self-uncertainty × Group 
Extremism × Group Ideology three-way interaction for goodwill and attitudes that qualified the 
Self-uncertainty × Group Extremism two-way interaction. The shape of this three-way 
interaction showed that when exposed to an extreme liberal-oriented SATI, self-uncertainty 
predicted greater perceptions of goodwill and more positive attitudes towards the group. This 
effect was absent in the equally liberal-minded moderate conditions, as well as in the moderate 
and extreme conservative conditions (see Figures 3 and 4). Though un-hypothesized, this finding 
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resembles the two-way interaction between self-uncertainty and group extremism described 
above and advances scholarship by considering how the ideology of a group influences its 
attractiveness when ideological congruence is not a salient factor.  
The UTM claims conservatives have a unique epistemic need for certainty and safety; 
thus, they should be more prone to identify with extreme groups under conditions of uncertainty. 
The UTM also holds conservative groups and leaders are more persuasive during times of 
uncertainty because of the precise, unambiguous nature of conservative political projects (i.e., 
returning to a storied past and traditional values). Theoretically, the Self-uncertainty × Group 
Extremism × Group Ideology interaction cuts against these arguments, as it shows only when 
exposed to an extreme-liberal group did self-uncertainty predict higher scores for attitudes and 
goodwill. 
When interpreting these findings, context matters. The ideological congruence 
manipulation described the liberal group as valuing, “kindness and equality, fair treatment and 
equal rights for all, as well as embracing greater tolerance for the inclusion of all peoples,” 
whereas the conservative group was described as valuing, “honor, personal responsibility, 
courage, and patriotism, as well as respect for tradition and the sanctity of the individual.” 
Participants may have considered the HECP unfair, and, based on ideological aspects of the 
description, perceived the liberal version better suited to fight inequality. In this case, it stands to 
reason that under conditions of self-uncertainty when regarding the two extreme groups (liberal 
or conservative), the liberal version would be perceived as more attractive.   
Given that these findings relate student responses to university policy, it is important to 
consider the potentially broader trends on campuses. As Lukianoff and Haidt (2018) have 
argued, college administrators are increasingly employing “castastrophizing” rhetoric, which 
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involves magnifying the threat of otherwise relatively benign events. According to Lukianoff and 
Haidt, such catastrophizing not only encourages students to overreact to such events, but also 
emboldens them to adopt zero-tolerance stances. Regarding the HECP, the extreme group was 
more catastrophizing (e.g., “…we think it’s a crime to raise tuition and fees…”) and advocated a 
zero-tolerance stance (e.g., “To be a member of our group, you have to make it your goal to kill 
the HECP, and if you don’t fully buy into that, then all we have to say is: thanks but no thanks”). 
Future research might explore whether catastrophizing rhetoric sensitizes students to certain 
linguistic features of extreme groups. As survey data show, college administrators are on average 
more liberal than faculty, students, and the general public (Abrams, 2018). A further question 
might explore the notion that catastrophizing rhetoric is sensitizing students to become more 
vulnerable to the propaganda of extreme liberal groups. To be clear, that is not necessarily the 
position of this dissertation; however, as a possible explanation of the unanticipated three-way 
interaction, this possibility deserves consideration. More focused research is needed in this area. 
Ideological Congruence and Support for an Extreme Group 
There is debate within the psychology literature as to how ideology motivates 
identification with extreme groups. Hogg’s UIT framework argues the more self-uncertain the 
person, the more attractive the group, regardless of ideology. Conversely, Jost and Napier (2012) 
claim conservatives are fundamentally more prone to seek certainty, and thus, when uncertain, 
find authoritarian groups more attractive. Greenberg and Jonas (2003) have persuasively 
criticized the UTM, reasoning that virtually any rigid ideology has uncertainty-reducing utility, 
regardless of whether conservative or liberal.  
The results here support Hogg’s UIT and Greenberg and Jonas’ (2003) position, given 
how ideological congruence was largely a non-factor. Using congruence as a grouping variable, 
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and ideology as a predictor, ideology (scored from 0 = extremely liberal to 100 = extremely 
conservative) had a negative relationship with behavioral intentions. The more liberal 
participants’ ideology scores, the greater their intentions to act on behalf of a liberal-congruent 
group. Conversely, the more conservative participants’ ideology scores, the less likely they were 
to act on behalf of a conservative-congruent group. Liberals—not conservatives—were more 
likely to support the high entitative version of SATI when ideology was congruent. These 
findings support Greenberg and Jonas (2003) and contradict claims about conservatives being 
more prone to supporting extreme groups due to their unique epistemic needs.  
This finding was further bolstered by a significant Congruent Ideology × Group 
Extremism interaction. When participants were exposed to a group sharing their ideology, those 
in the moderate group condition reported significantly higher levels of identification, intentions, 
perceptions of source trustworthiness, and attitudes towards the group’s positions, relative to 
those in the extreme condition. If ideological congruence played a role in motivating participants 
to affiliate with the group, it was towards the moderate rather than the extreme version of SATI. 
This effect was found for liberals and conservatives alike, again undercutting the notion that 
conservatives alone have a unique predisposition towards extreme groups, as posited by the UTM.  
Perhaps the simplest explanation of the Congruent Ideology × Group Extremism 
interaction is that ideological congruence diminishes the attractiveness of extreme groups in 
ways that do not apply to moderate groups. This possibility runs counter to research showing that 
homogenous ideological networks breed extreme attitudes (e.g., Binder et al., 2009). However, 
as reviewed earlier, ingroup inclusion has psychological, cultural, and existential benefits. 
Ideological congruence signals shared values, and in turn, belongingness to a shared identity. If 
belongingness provides equanimity, then it stands to reason people would prefer a moderate 
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group over an extreme one, given the likelihood that more extreme groups tend to espouse 
actions and opinions that may be unsettling or upsetting. Disagreement with a group that shares 
one’s ideology may heighten perceived exclusion prospects, upending the equanimity of stable 
ingroup identification. Thus, ideological congruence may dampen support for extreme groups, as 
a moderate-congruent group is more inclusive, and, thus, poses fewer prospects for opinion 
disagreement. Compared to the findings for H2 through H4, self-uncertainty, group extremism, 
and their interaction were all found to be better predictors of attraction to extreme groups than 
either ideology or ideological congruence.   
Counterargumentation and Persuasion  
The ability and willingness to produce counterarguments is indicative of the cognitive 
processing that accompanies resistance to persuasion—in this case resistance to the HECP as 
advocated by the SATI group. However, to the author’s knowledge, no studies have examined 
counterarguing as a function of self-uncertainty or in response to extreme groups. Participants in 
the present research were given three pro-HECP prompts and asked to stipulate whether they 
agreed with them, and then provide answers indicating why or why not. Analyses showed 
significantly more disagreement in the form of counterargument production in the self-
uncertainty versus self-certainty condition. However, group extremism and the interaction 
between group extremism and self-uncertainty did not produce significant results in this regard. 
It was self-uncertainty alone that appeared to motivate counterarguing, and not affiliation with a 
group, extreme or otherwise. Given that self-uncertainty resulted in increased counterarguing, 
one interpretation for this finding is that counterarguing worked as an uncertainty-reducing 
mechanism, a conclusion consistent with theories arguing that uncertainty is an aversive feeling 
state, and people use communication behaviors to manage their uncertainty (e.g., uncertainty-
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reduction theory; Berger & Calabrese, 1974; the motivation to reduce uncertainty model; 
Kramer, 1999).  
A review of participant responses helps to explain this conclusion. Prompt 2 argued the 
HECP would positively influence students at the University of Oklahoma. In response, some 
participants argued the HECP would harm students, for example: “Many will be forced to drop 
out, and the backlash from students could be very very [sic] negative.” Others responded with 
arguments related to fairness, for example: “I do not think it is fair for someone like me, a 
financially-struggling, working, college student, to have to pay more in order to assist out of 
state students.” Still, others argued the increase might make tuition less affordable, undermining 
diversity initiatives in the process, for example: “Myself and many other students cannot pay for 
an increase in tuition costs, this increase will only lead to a less diverse economic group of 
students.” Though the premises varied, the thrust of counterarguments maintained the HECP 
would negatively impact student life.   
Prompt 3 asserted the HECP would not force any students to drop out. Some participants 
responded with incredulity, such as, “Some students WILL [sic] have to drop out or transfer due 
to the ridiculous tuition increase” and “Unless [the university] plans on handing out more 
financial aid to the students who need it, they will drop out. So don’t even try feeding me that.” 
Other students provided personal insights, noting they could not afford the increase: “I 
personally am unsure if my parents would be able to afford to send me here if the tuition prices 
rose.” And still, others cited peer experiences: “I have a friend who recently had to take the 
semester off to work in order to be able to afford her college education; who's to say that she 
could ever be able to come back to college if the tuition was raised by 20%?” Again, while 
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students offered differing grounds for their disagreement, counterarguments almost entirely 
disputed the claim the HECP would not cause student to drop out.      
Overall, counterarguments for prompt 2 and 3 were negative against the HECP. As this 
finding was not present for group type or ideology, it is likely not due to persuasion by SATI—
although some responses echoed SATI talking points (e.g., “…some students will have to drop 
out…”). Similarly, this finding departs from UIT, as the theory would argue counterarguing 
should reflect group identification. Considering an alternative theoretical framework, 
uncertainty-reduction theory (URT) posits that people have a threshold for uncertainty, such that, 
when above the threshold, they become motivated to reduce uncertainty (Berger & Calabrese, 
1974). In this study, the combination of induced self-uncertainty and uncertainty from the 
pending HECP increase may have been too much. As Berger (1995) argued, people use 
communication behaviors to actively seek information to reduce uncertainty. The finding here is 
that communication behavior (e.g., counterarguing against the HECP) were more robust in the 
self-uncertainty condition. This falls outside the UIT framework, and suggests other motivational 
mechanisms, such as uncertainty reduction needs during particular strategic types of interactions. 
As URT was not used as an explanatory framework within the present theorizing, further 
investigation is needed to understand the role of counterarguments as a function of different 
uncertainty reduction strategies. Moreover, future research would do well to integrate the two 
theories to further investigate strategic counterarguing as a form of uncertainty-reduction within 
the context of group interaction.     
Source Credibility and the Appeal of Extreme Groups 
There was an unpredicted main effect for group extremism. As expected, participants 
identified with and perceived more goodwill from the moderate group; however, contrary to 
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expectations, exposure to the extreme group resulted in relatively higher ratings for competence 
and message quality. Side-by-side these results tell a seemingly conflicting story. Participants 
identified less with the extreme group, and perceived less goodwill from the extreme group, yet 
found the extreme group to be more competent, and rated it higher on perceived message quality. 
Since this was a main effect for group extremism and not self-uncertainty, these results are 
unexplained by UIT alone, as well as research into persuasion and social influence.   
A large body of research has demonstrated the use of explicit (Miller et al., 2007), 
freedom threatening (Dillard & Shen, 2005), or expectancy-violating (Burgoon et al., 2002) 
language undermines the efficacy of persuasive messages, resulting in source derogation (Quick 
& Considine, 2008). A long-standing convention of persuasion research holds source credibility 
is essential for persuasion, as loss of credibility not only undermines influence in the present but 
also hampers future persuasion attempts (Hovland et al., 1953). And yet, extreme groups employ 
these vary language features, while still being able to effectively recruit followers (Bruscella, & 
Bisel, 2018). These observations appear to be at odds. If threatening or explicit language 
undermines source credibility, and credibility is required for long-term influence, how then can 
extreme groups recruit followers over the long-term?  
One possible answer is that using forceful, threatening language undermines some 
aspects of credibility, but not others. This effect is akin to a source being forceful, while un-
liked, but speaking with such confidence that they appear competent. A similar effect was found 
for the unexpected main effect of group extremism. The leaders of the extreme SATI group were 
direct, forceful, and confident, all the while being factually incorrect about many of the positions 
they advocated. Still, participants found them more competent than the leaders of the moderate 
SATI group, who expressed openness to dialogue and preference for democratic processes.  
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These results imply that the dimensions of source credibility may operate in such a way 
that, under certain circumstances, confident, direct, and forceful speakers are viewed as less 
likable, but more competent. In this scenario, a critical dimension of source credibility (i.e., 
competence) would remain intact for future influence attempts. This idea may help untangle the 
contradiction whereby extreme groups employ language features research shows undermine 
influence. Simply put, confidence may be conflated with competence, especially when the source 
has the trappings of credibility (i.e., being interviewed on television) and the receiver has little 
knowledge about the issues at hand (e.g., a new HECP increase).  
Similar results have been found in recent research. LaVoie, Quick, Riles, and Lambert 
(2017), for instance, found graphic cigarette warnings induced psychological reactance. 
However, although reactance increased perceptions of domineeringness, perceptions of source 
expertise and trustworthiness were not diminished as hypothesized. In other words, although the 
source was considered domineering, negative evaluations did not extend to other dimensions of 
credibility. Similar to credibility ratings for the extreme group, the effect noted by Lavoie et al. is 
akin to, “I do not like you, but find you competent, nonetheless.” These findings run counter to 
the majority of reactance research, leading researchers to call for greater scrutiny of the different 
dimensions of source credibility. This dissertation echoes LaVoie et al.’s (2017) call, arguing for 
greater examination of unique source credibility attributes, especially as credibility relates to 
extreme groups.  
Limitations and Future Directions 
 There are several limitations bearing on the experimental results reported here. First, 
operationalizing extreme groups is a challenge for any researcher. The author relied on previous 
work testing UIT (Hogg et al., 2010; Massey et al., 2017) to replicate extreme student group 
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stimuli for use in this study. Although the manipulation showed results similar to previous 
studies, in light of the un-hypothesized three-way interaction involving group ideology, it could 
be argued the extreme group may have been more in-line with accepted forms of campus 
advocacy (e.g., staging sit-ins) conducive to a liberal worldview, and actions such as blockading 
the campus may have been a bridge too far for conservative participants. As such, an extension 
of this study might be to create an extreme group with a more conservative orientation, making 
respect for authority, patriotism, and an emphasis on ingroup loyalty more salient, as well as 
providing a topic better suited to move conservatives towards extreme advocacy.  
  A second limitation relates to the concept of extremity. What is considered extreme in 
one environment might be considered normal in another. To operationalize extremism, the 
present study relied on Hogg’s conceptualization of high versus low levels of entitativity. 
Although a fruitful approach within the UIT tradition, greater distinction could be made 
concerning attributes that make persuasive messages perceived to be more or less extreme. One 
way to accomplish this might be to collect more extensive survey data as a means to understand 
better what a specific population considers to be extreme ideas, attitudes, or messages. Again, 
this dissertation argues extreme messages are those that deviate from normative expectations, as 
they espouse extreme opinions, beliefs, and attitudes (Binder et al., 2009; Borum, 2011). An area 
of future research would do well to identify normative expectations before messages are 
designed and data collection begins, to better identify and operationalize message features that 
are extreme relative to those that are not.  
 Third, and finally, there are limitations to the generalizability of the study findings. The 
study sample (e.g., college students from a departmental pool) would best be described as a 
nonprobability, convenience sample, thus findings may not be generalizable to non-student 
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samples. On the other hand, Etikan, Musa, and Alkassim (2016) have noted that convenience 
sampling may be acceptable when it is not possible to include all participants within a population 
due to the size of the population. In this case, the generalizability of findings is most 
appropriately considered in light of successful replications. Thus, this limitation is presented as 
an avenue of future research examining the persuasive appeal of extreme groups with samples 
primed with self-conceptual uncertainty. As noted, the present study is the second replication of 
Hogg et al. (2010), wherein college students primed with self-uncertainty showed greater 
affiliation with an extreme student group. The author presents results and limitations as a call to 
utilize the current design and materials to further explore these topics, to first replicate, and 
hopefully, find evidence of the generalizability of findings across related, yet different, samples. 
As the socio-demographic profile of college students mirrors the age-crime profile of individuals 
most likely to commit acts of violence and domestic terrorism, this call to replicate and extend 
the current experiment is both timely and socially important.     
Conclusion 
 This dissertation found the experience of self-uncertainty to have a strong effect on 
college students’ attitudes toward affiliating with a student group advocating the use of relatively 
extreme measures against an administration proposing an ostensibly unfair tuition increase. Self-
uncertainty within the receiver, and perceived extremism within the source group, interacted 
such that participants perceived the extreme group to care about them more and to hold their 
interests to heart more. At the same time, participants in the self-uncertainty condition also 
reported more positive attitudes towards the extreme group’s positions.  
However, ideological congruence appeared largely to be a non-factor, with its only effect 
involving behavioral intentions towards the group, whereas, self-uncertainty interacted with 
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congruence such that exposure to a moderate-congruent group increased identification, attitudes, 
trust, and behavioral intentions. These findings are informative and useful in light of the 
currently growing national and worldwide threats posed by extreme groups. Indeed, the profile 
of those who generally join extreme groups and movements approximates that of college 
students—that is, emerging adults with higher than average education.  
Although much research has been devoted to understanding the psychology of identifying 
with extreme groups, considerably less has been devoted to the persuasive campaigns such 
groups employ to attract young people. Toward that end, this dissertation is intended to help 
inform the literature about the persuasive appeal extreme groups can exert on young, 
impressionable populations. Given the momentum of extreme groups on the left and right, across 
the globe, examining such a topic is timely and necessary. Accordingly, results of this 
dissertation are presented to advance research on extreme groups, and hopefully, better society. 
 Several practical insights can be gleaned from the research results. First, in light of how 
the concept of self-uncertainty consistently influenced the range of dependent variables, more 
consideration should be given to the motivational effect of various conditions that may foster 
self-uncertainty, and in turn cause individuals to doubt their position within the social fabric of 
society. Indeed, in his seminal work on authoritarianism, Fromm (1941) argued that rapid social 
change causes widespread uncertainty, motivating a need to seek and find certainty, thereby 
making strong leaders with definitive and authoritarian proscriptions increasingly attractive to 
those who are unsure of themselves or their place in the world. As a refugee who fled Europe 
under the specter of fascist totalitarianism in the 1930’s, Fromm’s speculations serve a theory 
building purpose, but also as a warning and a means of diagnosing the social conditions that can 
facilitate acquiescence toward authoritarian governance. Similar to his contemporary Harold 
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Lasswell’s (1927) work, Fromm’s thinking in these areas resonates with social and material 
conditions in many democratic societies in Western Europe and North America, where issues 
such as recession, immigration, austerity, and global and domestic terrorism seems to be 
enhancing the attractiveness of extreme groups across the very states that once stood as barriers 
against fascist and communist totalitarianism.  
 Although the ability to change social, cultural, and material conditions is beyond the 
power of most individuals, conducting research to better understand how such conditions 
motivate others to accept the proscriptions of extreme groups is a valuable and viable option. 
Viewed from this larger perspective, the findings reported here indicate the construct of self-
uncertainty can have a powerful motivational effect on college-aged, emerging adult populations. 
Furthermore, when self-uncertainty interacts with exposure to an extreme group, this same 
emerging adult population shows greater affiliation with the extreme group. In terms of practical 
applications, this important finding can inform policy makers—such as college administrators, 
professors, teachers, and graduate students—working with emerging adult populations, how to 
design strategies to ameliorate the underlying condition contributing to self-uncertainty that can 
motivate a sense of attraction toward extreme groups.  
 The reduction of self-uncertainty is particularly important for emerging adult populations, 
who are the most vulnerable to the appeal of extreme groups, and the potential for violence and 
terrorism. As extreme groups from across the ideological spectrum appear to be gaining traction 
globally, threatening democratic societies—often at the expense of reasoned debate and mutual 
coexistence—the call for examining the persuasive appeal of extreme groups is a serious and 
timely endeavor. To this end, the present research has sought to illuminate and better understand 
the nature of this critical social phenomenon.        
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Table 1.  
      
 
  Entitativity Indicators Deviating from Normality Assumptions        
  Pre-transformation         Post-transformation 
  
Variable Skewness 
S.E. 
Skewness 
Kurtosis  
S.E. 
Kurtosis 
K 𝜆  Skewness 
S.E. 
Skewness 
Kurtosis 
S.E. 
Kurtosis 
ENT1 16.57 0.12 312.34 0.24 1 .17 -0.71 0.12 0.72 0.24 
ENT2 14.6 0.12 240.05 0.24 1 .17 0.14 0.12 0.55 0.24 
ENT3 14.3 0.12 204.53 0.24 1 .17 0.04 0.12 0.5 0.24 
ENT4 18.31 0.12 356.34 0.24 1 .17 0.1 0.12 0.35 0.24 
ENT5 20.52 0.12 421.00 0.24 1 .17 -0.21 0.12 0.38 0.24 
ENT6 20.16 0.12 409.74 0.24 1 .17 0.08 0.12 0.03 0.24 
ENT7 20.54 0.12 421.99 0.24 1 .17 0.31 0.12 0.44 0.24 
ENT8 17.05 0.12 317.95 0.24 1 .17 -0.45 0.12 -0.04 0.24 
ENT9 20.49 0.12 420.00 0.24 1 .17 -0.29 0.12 0.11 0.24 
ENT10 20.49 0.12 420.00 0.24  1 .17 -0.45 0.12 -0.43 0.24 
Note. All items transformed with the following equation, Y*= (Y + k)λ such that when λ = 0, Y*= ln(Y + k), and λ ≠ 0, then  Y*= (Y + 
k)λ (Fink, 2009).   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
      
 
  
  97 
Table 2.  
Identification Indicators Deviating from Normality Assumptions   
 
  
  Pre-transformation         Post-transformation 
  
Variable Skewness 
S.E. 
Skewness 
Kurtosis  
S.E. 
Kurtosis 
k 𝜆  Skewness 
S.E. 
Skewness 
Kurtosis 
S.E. 
Kurtosis 
ID1 20.57 0.12  423.00 0.24  3 .2 -0.25 0.12  -0.28 0.24  
ID2 20.57 0.12  423.00 0.24  3 .2 0.02 0.12  -1.10 0.24  
ID3 20.08 0.12  408.47 0.24  3 .2 -0.10 0.12  -0.05 0.24  
ID4 20.54 0.12  422.00 0.24  3 .2 0.15 0.12   0.18 0.24  
ID5 20.05 0.12  407.10 0.24  3 .2 0.30 0.12  0.73 0.24  
ID6 20.54 0.12  422.00 0.24  3 .2 0.09 0.12  0.35 0.24  
ID7 17.39 0.12  318.43 0.24  3 .2 -0.11 0.12  -0.23 0.24  
ID8 20.54 0.12  422.00 0.24  3 .2 0.17 0.12  0.13 0.24  
ID9 14.41 0.12  211.83 0.24 3 .2 -0.23 0.12  -0.22 0.24  
Note. All items transformed with the following equation, Y*= (Y + k)λ such that when λ = 0, Y*= ln(Y + k), and λ ≠ 0, then  Y*= (Y + 
k)λ (Fink, 2009).   
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Table 3.  
      
 
  Behavioral Intentions Indicators Deviating from Normality Assumptions   
 
  
  Pre-transformation         Post-transformation 
  
Variable Skewness 
S.E. 
Skewness 
Kurtosis  
S.E. 
Kurtosis 
k 𝜆  Skewness 
S.E. 
Skewness 
Kurtosis 
S.E. 
Kurtosis 
BI1 20.54 0.12  422.00 0.24  1 .2 0.05 0.12  -1.52 0.24  
BI2 20.54 0.12  422.00 0.24  1 .2 0.43 0.12  -1.48 0.24  
BI3 20.54 0.12  422.00 0.24  1 .2 0.15 0.12  -1.52 0.24  
BI4 20.54 0.12  422.00 0.24  1 .2 0.12 0.12   -1.04 0.24  
BI5 14.33 0.12  205.55 0.24  1 .2 0.13 0.12  -1.36 0.24  
BI6 15.55 0.12  252.13 0.24  1 .2 0.18 0.12  -1.36 0.24  
BI7 20.54 0.12  422.00 0.24  1 .2 0.07 0.12  -1.32 0.24  
BI8 20.54 0.12  422.00 0.24  1 .2 0.94 0.12  -0.66 0.24  
BI9 20.57 0.12 423.00 0.24 1 .2 0.29 0.12  -1.58 0.24  
BI0 20.54 0.12  422.00 0.24  1 .2 0.38 0.12  -1.40 0.24  
Note. All items transformed with the following equation, Y*= (Y + k)λ such that when λ = 0, Y*= ln(Y + k), and λ ≠ 0, then  Y*= (Y + 
k)λ (Fink, 2009).   
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Table 4.  
      
 
  Source Credibility Indicators Deviating from Normality Assumptions   
 
  
  Pre-transformation         Post-transformation 
  
Variable Skewness 
S.E. 
Skewness 
Kurtosis  
S.E. 
Kurtosis 
k 𝜆  Skewness 
S.E. 
Skewness 
Kurtosis 
S.E. 
Kurtosis 
COMP1 19.05 0.12  375.26 0.24  5 .1 0.41 0.12  0.74 0.24  
COMP2 19.83 0.12  400.93 0.24  5 .1 -0.50 0.12  -0.04 0.24  
COMP3 20.52 0.12  421.00 0.24  5 .1 -0.33 0.12  0.18 0.24  
COMP4 20.54 0.12  421.95 0.24  5 .1 0.03 0.12   0.24 0.24  
COMP5 20.33 0.12  415.63 0.24  5 .1 -0.21 0.12  0.59 0.24  
COMP6 20.52 0.12  421.00 0.24  5 .1 -0.01 0.12  0.10 0.24  
GWILL1 20.47 0.12  419.00 0.24  5 .1 -0.10 0.12  0.04 0.24  
GWILL2 20.47 0.12  419.00 0.24  5 .1 0.45 0.12  0.84 0.24  
GWILL3 20.45 0.12  419.21 0.24  5 .1 -0.12 0.12  -0.52 0.24  
GWILL4 20.52 0.12  421.00 0.24  5 .1 0.32 0.12  0.65 0.24  
GWILL5 17.03 0.12  313.55 0.24  5 .1 -0.40 0.12  -0.38 0.24  
GWILL6 20.54 0.12  421.98 0.24  5 .1 0.15 0.12  0.47 0.24  
TRUST1 20.49 0.12  419.83 0.24  5 .12 -0.12 0.12  0.25 0.24  
TRUST2 13.63 0.12  192.97 0.24  5 .12 0.04 0.12   0.55 0.24  
TRUST3 14.44 0.12  207.48 0.24  5 .12 0.18 0.12  0.80 0.24  
TRUST4 20.47 0.12  419.00 0.24  5 .12 -0.01 0.12  0.07 0.24  
TRUST5 20.49 0.12 420.00 0.24 5 .12 -0.13 0.12  0.33 0.24  
TRUST6 20.47 0.12  419.00 0.24  5 .12 -0.12 0.12  1.24 0.24  
Note. All items transformed with the following equation, Y*= (Y + k)λ such that when λ = 0, Y*= ln(Y + k), and λ ≠ 0, then  Y*= (Y + 
k)λ (Fink, 2009).     
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Table 5.  
      
 
  Attitude Indicators Deviating from Normality Assumptions   
 
  
  Pre-transformation         Post-transformation 
  
Variable Skewness 
S.E. 
Skewness 
Kurtosis  
S.E. 
Kurtosis 
k 𝜆  Skewness 
S.E. 
Skewness 
Kurtosis 
S.E. 
Kurtosis 
AT1 20.27 0.12  413.82 0.24  5 .12 -0.30 0.12  0.26 0.24  
AT2 11.72 0.12  144.10 0.24  5 .12 -0.03 0.12  0.79 0.24  
AT3 20.54 0.12  421.91 0.24  5 .12 -0.20 0.12  0.50 0.24  
AT4 20.54 0.12  422.00 0.24  5 .12 -0.02 0.12   0.17 0.24  
AT5 20.54 0.12  422.00 0.24  5 .12 0.10 0.12  0.21 0.24  
AT6 16.68 0.12  292.04 0.24  5 .12 -0.07 0.12  0.55 0.24  
Note. All items transformed with the following equation, Y*= (Y + k)λ such that when λ = 0, Y*= ln(Y + k), and λ ≠ 0, then  Y*= (Y + 
k)λ (Fink, 2009).   
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Table 6.  
      
 
  Message Quality Indicators Deviating from Normality Assumptions   
 
  
  Pre-transformation         Post-transformation 
  
Variable Skewness 
S.E. 
Skewness 
Kurtosis  
S.E. 
Kurtosis 
k 𝜆  Skewness 
S.E. 
Skewness 
Kurtosis 
S.E. 
Kurtosis 
MQ1 7.49 0.12  55.96 0.24  5 .12 -0.04 0.12  -0.05 0.24  
MQ2 20.49 0.12  420.00 0.24  5 .12 -0.24 0.12  -0.13 0.24  
MQ3 20.49 0.12  419.87 0.24  5 .12 0.39 0.12  0.19 0.24  
MQ4 20.52 0.12  421.00 0.24  5 .12 0.03 0.12   0.23 0.24  
MQ5 20.49 0.12  419.91 0.24  5 .12 0.33 0.12  -0.28 0.24  
MQ6 20.23 0.12 412.61 0.24 5 .12 -0.13 0.12  0.33 0.24  
MQ7 20.54 0.12  422.00 0.24  5 .12 -0.08 0.12  0.19 0.24  
Note. All items transformed with the following equation, Y*= (Y + k)λ such that when λ = 0, Y*= ln(Y + k), and λ ≠ 0, then  Y*= (Y + 
k)λ (Fink, 2009).   
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Table 7.  
      
 
  Self-uncertainty Indicators Deviating from Normality Assumptions   
 
  
  Pre-transformation         Post-transformation 
  
Variable Skewness 
S.E. 
Skewness 
Kurtosis  
S.E. 
Kurtosis 
k 𝜆  Skewness 
S.E. 
Skewness 
Kurtosis 
S.E. 
Kurtosis 
UN1 20.28 0.12  414.56 0.24  5 .1 0.48 0.12  -0.76 0.24  
UN2 9.98 0.12  99.24 0.24  5 .1 0.47 0.12  -0.33 0.24  
UN3 20.57 0.12  423.00 0.24  5 .1 0.48 0.12  -0.63 0.24  
UN4 20.54 0.12  422.00 0.24  5 .1 0.91 0.12   -0.23 0.24  
UN5 20.11 0.12  409.86 0.24  5 .1 0.60 0.12  -0.76 0.24  
UN6 20.57 0.12  423.00 0.24  5 .1 0.33 0.12  -0.98 0.24  
UN7 17.06 0.12  310.19 0.24  5 .12 0.67 0.12  -0.68 0.24  
UN8 14.62 0.12  216.46 0.24  5 .12 0.59 0.12  -0.54 0.24  
UN9 14.35 0.12  206.02 0.24  5 .12 0.42 0.12  -0.85 0.24  
UN10 20.54 0.12  421.92 0.24  5 .12 0.78 0.12  -0.70 0.24  
UN11* 20.47 0.12  419.00 0.24  5 .12 — 0.12  — 0.24  
UN12 20.54 0.12  422.00 0.24  5 .12 0.33 0.12  -0.06 0.24  
Note. All items transformed with the following equation, Y*= (Y + k)λ such that when λ = 0, Y*= ln(Y + k), and λ ≠ 0, then  Y*= (Y + 
k)λ (Fink, 2009). *𝜆𝑖< .50 item dropped.  
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Table 8.      
Eigenvalues for Principal Components Variables     
Variables Eigen value % Total variance Cumulative % of variance 
Entitativity  5.56 55.60  55.60 
Identification 6.08 67.51  67.51 
Behavioral Intentions 6.78 67.83  67.83 
Source Competence 4.34 72.40  72.40 
Source Goodwill  3.86 64.31  64.31 
Source Trust 4.52 75.26  75.26 
Attitudes 4.42 73.62  73.62 
Message Quality 4.86 69.40  69.40 
Self-uncertainty 6.07 55.17  55.17 
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Table 9.  
Reliabilities and Bivariate Correlations Between Variables 
  PCreliability 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
1. Entitativity 0.91 1                
2. Identification 0.94 0.21** 1        
3. Behavioral intentions 0.95 0.08 0.72** 1       
4. Source competence 0.92 0.59** 0.56** 0.38** 1      
5. Source trust  0.89 0.37** 0.64** 0.39** 0.70** 1     
6. Source goodwill 0.93 0.15** 0.62** 0.44** 0.55** 0.70** 1    
7. Attitude 0.93 0.29** 0.70** 0.50** 0.67** 0.75** 0.69** 1   
8. Mess. quality 0.93 0.59** 0.68** 0.47** 0.78** 0.72** 0.59** 0.75** 1  
9. Self-uncertainty 0.92 0.10* 0.14** 0.18** 0.15** 0.17** 0.12** 0.16** 0.16** 1 
Note. All items transformed with the following equation, Y*= (Y + k)λ such that when λ = 0, Y*= ln(Y + k), and λ ≠ 0, then  Y*= (Y + 
k)λ (Fink, 2009). All indexes were formed by saving first unrotated principal component as a standardized variable (M = 0; SD = 1). 
PCreliability calculated as N/(N-1) × (E-1)/E where N = number of items and E = Eigenvalues for principal components. 
* p < .05; ** p < .01 
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Table 10. 
Simple Effect for Congruent Ideology × Group Extremism Two-way Interaction 
  
                   Congruent ideology 
 Dependent variables   Moderate group Extreme group   
Identification 
 
      
 N 
 
103 93   
M 
 
0.27a -0.21b   
SD 
 
0.97 1.01   
Behavioral intentions 
 
   
N 
 
105 97  
M 
 
0.20a -0.11b  
SD 
 
1.03 1.05  
Trust 
 
   
N 
 
104 96  
M 
 
0.20a -0.13b  
SD 
 
0.95 1.15  
Attitude 
 
   
N 
 
104 96   
M 
 
0.17a -0.14b   
SD   0.91 1.13         
Note. Means with different subscripts within rows are significantly different at p < .05. 
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Figure 1. Simple effect of Self-uncertainty on Goodwill within the Extreme condition.  
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Figure 2. Simple effect of Self-uncertainty on Attitudes within the Extreme condition.  
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Figure 3. Self-uncertainty × Group Extremism × Group Ideology interaction on Goodwill.  
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Figure 4. Self-uncertainty × Group extremism × Group ideology interaction on Attitudes.  
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APPENDIX A: MAGNITUDE INSTRUCTIONS 
Researchers at the University of Oklahoma are studying young peoples’ attitudes towards certain 
topics. Before we ask you to consent to participate in the study, we would like to show you the 
kind of questions you will be asked.  
 
Instructions: Suppose we would like to know how much knowledge you have about your major. 
To answer this question, use a number from 0 (zero) to infinity. Zero means 
you have no knowledge at all about your major, and higher numbers represent greater levels of 
knowledge. 
 
If you feel you have moderate knowledge about your major, rate your knowledge as 100. If your 
knowledge is twice as much as a moderate level, rate your knowledge as 200; if 
your knowledge about your major is half the moderate level, rate your knowledge as 50. 
 
You can use any number from zero on up, such as 18, 193, or 347.  
 
Thus, 
 
I have no knowledge at all about my major = 0 
I have moderate knowledge about my major = 100 
Use any number from zero on up, which could extend beyond 100 
 
Please be sure to respond using a number. Typing “infinity” will not work.  
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APPENDIX B: MEASURES 
Political Ideology (single indicator) 
This question asks you to locate your political orientation on a sale ranging from 0 (Extremely 
Liberal) to 100 (Extremely Conservative). 
 
A liberal orientation involves being open to new behavior or opinions and willing to discard 
traditional values.  
 
A conservative orientation involves holding to traditional attitudes and values and being 
cautious about change, typically in relation to politics or religion. 
Please locate your political orientation on the scale below. 
 
Zero means you consider yourself to be completely liberal, whereas, 100 means you consider to 
be completely conservative. You must click on or move the slider to advance. 
 
I consider myself to be: 
0 = Extremely Liberal; 100 = Extremely Conservative 
 
Political Ideology (Multiple Indicators) 
I consider myself to be Extremely Liberal (0) to Extremely Conservative (100) on: 
Social Issues 
Issues of Taxes and Spending 
Foreign Policy Issues 
Entitativity 
Please answer the following questions regarding your perceptions of the group Students Against 
Tuition Inequality (SATI). 
 
Please use the following scale:  
not at all = 0  
moderately = 100 
 
Use any number from zero on up, which could extend beyond 100 
 
A hierarchical structure consists of multiple levels, as with a chain of command that looks like a 
pyramid, with a President or CEO at the top, supervisors and management in the middle, and 
workers at the base. 
1. Using this definition, how hierarchically structured is the group you just watched in the 
video? 
When something is cohesive, it means it hangs together. That is, when a team or group is said to 
be cohesive, it means the members are unified and well integrated into the group. 
2. Using this definition, how cohesive do you think the group is you just watched in the video?  
3. How clearly defined is the group you just watched in the video? 
4. How organized is the group you just watched in the video? 
If a group of people is considered to be homogeneous, then they might be thought of as all being 
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relatively the same or similar. 
5. Based on this definition, how homogeneous is the group you just watched in the video? 
6. How clear is Students Against Tuition Inequality in it’s message? 
The term distinctive, when applied to a group or a team, refers to how unique the quality of its 
identity is considered to be. 
7. Based on this definition, how distinctive is Students Against Tuition Inequality as a group?  
8. How intolerant of dissent is Students Against Tuition Inequality?  
9. How strongly led is Students Against Tuition Inequality? 
10. How intent on forceful action is Students Against Tuition Inequality? 
 
Identification 
Please answer the following questions regarding your perceptions about the group Students 
Against Tuition Inequality (SATI). 
 
Please indicate how much you feel you agree with each statement. 
 
1. How much do you feel you'd like to get to know the members of the group Students Against 
Tuition Inequality 
2. Based on what you know from the video, how much do you feel you might like to join the 
group Students Against Tuition Inequality 
3. How likely would you be to stand up for the group Students Against Tuition Inequality? 
4. How much do you feel like you can identify with the group Students Against Tuition 
Inequality 
5. How much do you like the group members from Students Against Tuition Inequality 
6. In general, how much do you like the group Students Against Tuition Inequality 
7. How much personal similarity do you feel there is between you and the group Students 
Against Tuition Inequality 
8. How much do you relate to the group members from Students Against Tuition Inequality 
9. How much do you feel like you could connect with the members of the group Students 
Against Tuition Inequality?”  
 
Behavioral Intentions 
For each of the following questions, please indicate how likely you are to behave or act on behalf 
of Students Against Tuition Inequality (SATI). 
 
What is the likelihood you would:  
1. Attend a monthly meeting 
2. Perform clerical work 
3. Lobby on behalf of SATI 
4. Petition the university on behalf of SATI 
5. Write a letter to the university on behalf of SATI 
6. Participate in demonstrations on behalf of SATI 
7. Engage in a sit-in on behalf of SATI 
8. Blockade a university office on behalf of SATI 
9. Help run or organize / SATI 
10. Act as a representative of SATI?  
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Source Credibility 
This section seeks to measure your impressions of the group Students Against Tuition Inequality 
(SATI) based on the video you just watched.  
Please indicate how much you feel you agree with each statement.  
 
Competence 
1. How intelligent is SATI? 
2. How trained is SATI? 
3. How expert is SATI? 
4. How informed is SATI? 
5. How competent is SATI? 
6. How bright is SATI? 
 
Trustworthiness 
1. SATI is honest.  
2. SATI is trustworthy.  
3. SATI in honorable. 
4. SATI is moral.  
5. SATI is ethical.  
6. SATI is genuine.  
 
Goodwill 
1. SATI cares about me.  
2. SATI has my interests at heart.  
3. SATI is charitable.  
4. SATI is concerned about me.  
5. SATI is sensitive.  
6. SATI is understanding.  
 
Attitude 
This section seeks to measure your attitude toward the positions advocated by the group 
Student's Against Tuition Inequality (SATI). 
 
Please indicate how much you feel you agree with each statement. 
1. How positive were the positions advocated in the video? 
2. How good were the positions advocated in the video? 
3. How favorable were the positions advocated in the video? 
4. How acceptable were the positions advocated in the video? 
5. How right were the positions advocated in the video? 
6. How wise were the positions advocated in the video? 
 
Message Quality 
This section seeks to measure your perception of the quality of the message that was advocated 
in the video you just watched.  
 
Please indicate how much you feel you agree with each statement. 
1. How persuasive was the message? 
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2. How clear was the message? 
3. How accurate was the message? 
4. How memorable was the message? 
5. How important was the message? 
6. How helpful was the message? 
7. How useful was the message? 
 
Self-uncertainty  
Read each of the following statements and decide how much you agree with each according to 
your beliefs and experiences. 
 
1. My beliefs about myself often conflict with one another. 
2. One day I might have one opinion of myself and on another day I might have a different 
opinion. 
3. I wonder about what kind of person I really am. 
4. I feel that I am not really the person that I appear to be. 
5. When I think about the kind of person I have been in the past, I'm not sure what I was really 
like. 
6. I often experience conflict between the different aspects of my personality. 
7. I think I know other people better than I know myself. 
8. My beliefs about myself seem to change very frequently. 
9. If I were asked to describe my personality, my description might end up being different from 
one day to another. 
10. Even if I wanted to, I don't think I would tell someone what I'm really like. 
11. In general, I have a clear sense of who I am and what I am. 
12. It is often hard for me to make up my mind about things because I don't really know what I 
want.  
 
Counter-Arguing 
Prompt 1 
We are interested in finding out why you feel the way you do about the HECP tuition increase. 
 
Please indicate whether you accept or reject the statement about the consequences of passing the 
HECP. If you reject the statement, please give your REASONS for doing so. If you have none, 
then write “none.”  
 
The HECP will improve the quality of education at the University of Oklahoma. 
(Accept) 
(Reject) 
 
REASONS 
 
Prompt 2 
We are interested in finding out why you feel the way you do about the HECP tuition increase. 
 
Please indicate whether you accept or reject the statement about the consequences of passing the 
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HECP. If you reject the statement, please give your REASONS for doing so. If you have none, 
then write “none.”  
 
The HECP will positively influence students at the University of Oklahoma. 
(Accept) 
(Reject) 
 
REASONS 
 
Prompt 3 
We are interested in finding out why you feel the way you do about the HECP tuition increase. 
 
Please indicate whether you accept or reject the statement about the consequences of passing the 
HECP. If you reject the statement, please give your REASONS for doing so. If you have none, 
then write “none.”  
 
No students at the University of Oklahoma will be forced to drop out if the HECP passes. 
(Accept) 
(Reject) 
 
REASONS 
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APPENDIX C: CODING INSTRUCTIONS 
Counter arguments: 
Counter = speak or act in opposition to. 
Argument = a reason or set of reasons given with the aim of persuading others that an action or 
idea is right or wrong. 
  
Counter argument responses: 
  
·        express disagreement with the message 
·        express negative intention to comply with the message 
·        express that they are intending to do something contrary to the message 
·        express derogations of the source 
·        express derogation of the message: long, boring, stupid 
·        disagree with the tone of the message 
  
How to code? 
 
Within each response, each counterargument = 1; and everything else = 0 
 
Argument: 
 
“The HECP will improve the quality of education at the University of Oklahoma.” 
 
Example of 1 counterargument: 
 
“From what I understand from the video, HECP costs are fees for out of state students and 
foreign exchange students. If OU wanted to improve the quality of education, academic excellent 
fee's would raise instead.” 
 
Example of 3 counterarguments: 
 
“There is no way to hold the university accountable should the money they receive from the 
HECP be used in other ways. There would likely be little to no difference between the quality of 
life at OU now and the quality of life at OU if they require student pay more mandatory fees. If 
anything, one could argue that maybe the funding provided by the fee hike would go to the new 
president's massive pay raise, or to paying administration salaries, not improving any of the 
important and necessary things (like University Counseling, updated infrastructure, PARKING) 
that this proposes.” 
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APPENDIX D: OP-EDS 
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